Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the North Atlantic Figure IV-7
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gian Sea. This view is based on a differing interpreta- aircraft frequently exercise in the area south of Ice-
tion of the evidence as reflected in paragraphs 142-149 land and in the G-I-UK gap and could operate there
of chapter II. These agencies consider that the Soviets for at least several hours before returning to base.
view interdiction of US reinforcements to Europe to Operations by ASW aircraft probably would be re-
he of such significance and their submarine inventory stricted to the Norwegian Sea north of the G-I-UK
of sufficient depth to warrant use of larger numbers of gap, however, because ASW aircraft are highly vulner-
attack submarines in this effort while maintaining able to Western air defenses and probably would rot
adequate forces near the G-I-UK gap and in the be able to operate safely near the G-I-UK gap once
Norwegian Sea. Accordingly, the number of attack hostilities began. Similarly, Soviet surface combatant
submarines would be correspondingly lower than the ships probably would not deploy south of Iceland for
10 torpedo attack submarines postulated for deploy- initial wartime operations because NA'TO would likely
ment near the G-I-UK gap in paragraph 173 below, or have air superiority there.
the 10 or so torpedo attack submarines postulated for
the central Norwegian Sea in paragraph 183. 171. In addition to submarines, Soviet naval recon-
naissance forces in the Atlantic would include intelli-
170. Submarine ASW operations in the North At- gence collection ships and TU-95 long-range recon-
lantic could be augmented by TU-142 Bear F long- naissance aircraft operating from Northern Fleet
range ASW aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. These airfields, and possibly Cuba and Angola. Long-range
-V-36
Tapseret Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.