Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Table IV-9 probably would allocate many of their best submarines for antisubmarine warfare-those of the V-class-to Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated operations in the area south of the G-I-UK gap and.off To Be Available for Use in the the four NATO SSBN bases in the Atlantic. (See figure North Atlantic Ocean IV-7.) Furthermore, some of these ASW submarines ___ _January 1979 might also provide tactical support to Y-class SSBNs, Cruise Missile Submarines which have to pass south of the gap to cover targets in Nuclear ..................... _............. . 15 the eastern United States. These tasks would require D iese l ............_. ...._. . . . . . , . ..... ..... .. 7D e some two-thirds (six to 10 units) of those V-class Total ... ....................... 22 submarines available for even minimal coverage. Torpedo Attack Submarines 167. Nuclear ....... ................................... 10 Soviets mig Dicsel ................ ............................ 32 also want to commit some C-class submarines to Total .......... ........ 51 operations south of the gap, in the vicinity of Great Principal Surface Combatants Britain, and along the carrier transit routes to the Aircraft Carriers 1 Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile Destroyers 4 and trail Western aircraft carriers, amphibious task Destroyers ....... 4 forces, and other important targets as war became Missile Frigates 4 imminent, and to attack them at the outset of hostil- Frigates ....... 28 ities. Almost all of the available C-class submarines Total ... 48 (five to seven units) would be needed for minimal Naval Aircraft coverage of these areas. Strike Aircraft .......... .............. .............. 58 168. There is disagreement regarding the likely Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Aircraft 49 Tankers ............ number and role of other Soviet submarines which Fighters/Fighter-Bombers ....... .. 11 would be deployed south of Iceland. According to one ASW Fixed-Wing Aircraft ..... ....... .......... 48 view,'6 about 10 other submarines would probably be ASW/Reconnaissance Helicopters ........... 48 deployed south of Iceland and consist mostly of long- Total .......................... . ....... ........... 233 range diesel torpedo attack units. These subm arines - probably would be dispersed in North Atlantic ship-* General purpose forces assigned to the Soviet Nothern Fleet. Assumes that 60 percent of general purpose submarines, 70 percent ping lanes for reconnaissance and attacks on NATO of surface combatants, and 85 percent of naval aircraft would be shipping and naval targets of opportunity. Alterna- available after four lays of preparation. See paragraphs 102 and 103 tively a few might lay mines in confined waters near and table 11-8 in chapter II for information concerning the normal NATO naval bases and ports. Others might patrol off peacetime availability of Soviet naval forces. Some of these units major NATO naval bases to report on NATO move- could also be used in support of operations against northern Norway. Does not include two cruise missile and eight torpedo attack ments and attack major warships. submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial wartime deployment, some 20 submarines would probably be positioned in the Atlantic astride NATO's continue to concentrate their efforts in the Norwegian and arets Sa.'sea lines of communication to attack NA TO warships and Barents Sea.' and those convoys or ships carrying equipment for US Ui6-Onerations_Sou.th_oIIeland Army divisions in the initial phase of a war. The number of Soviet submarines dedicated to this effort tie So-ies would depend upon the number of carriers which the Soviets would believe likely to deploy to the Norwe- sIn view of the foregoing, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, notes that the allocation of specific numbers and classes 6 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; of Soviet submarines to specific tasks and ocean areas in para- the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of graphs 166-190 does not necessarily represent a high-confidence State; and the Director, National Security Agency. judgment of most probable Soviet courses of action. The inherent flexibilit y of naval warfare and the range of options available to a " The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence force as large as the Soviet Navy leads him to caution that other Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the initial force allocations may be equally likely. Navy. IV-35 c ret
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.