Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Table IV-9 probably would allocate many of their best submarines
for antisubmarine warfare-those of the V-class-to
Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated operations in the area south of the G-I-UK gap and.off
To Be Available for Use in the the four NATO SSBN bases in the Atlantic. (See figure
North Atlantic Ocean IV-7.) Furthermore, some of these ASW submarines
___ _January 1979 might also provide tactical support to Y-class SSBNs,
Cruise Missile Submarines which have to pass south of the gap to cover targets in
Nuclear ..................... _............. . 15 the eastern United States. These tasks would require
D iese l ............_. ...._. . . . . . , . ..... ..... .. 7D e some two-thirds (six to 10 units) of those V-class
Total ... ....................... 22 submarines available for even minimal coverage.
Torpedo Attack Submarines 167.
Nuclear ....... ................................... 10 Soviets mig
Dicsel ................ ............................ 32
also want to commit some C-class submarines to
Total .......... ........ 51 operations south of the gap, in the vicinity of Great
Principal Surface Combatants Britain, and along the carrier transit routes to the
Aircraft Carriers 1 Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. They probably
Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept
Cruisers ... 1
Missile Destroyers 4 and trail Western aircraft carriers, amphibious task
Destroyers ....... 4 forces, and other important targets as war became
Missile Frigates 4 imminent, and to attack them at the outset of hostil-
Frigates ....... 28 ities. Almost all of the available C-class submarines
Total ... 48 (five to seven units) would be needed for minimal
Naval Aircraft coverage of these areas.
Strike Aircraft .......... .............. .............. 58 168. There is disagreement regarding the likely
Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Aircraft 49
Tankers ............ number and role of other Soviet submarines which
Fighters/Fighter-Bombers ....... .. 11 would be deployed south of Iceland. According to one
ASW Fixed-Wing Aircraft ..... ....... .......... 48 view,'6 about 10 other submarines would probably be
ASW/Reconnaissance Helicopters ........... 48 deployed south of Iceland and consist mostly of long-
Total .......................... . ....... ........... 233 range diesel torpedo attack units. These subm arines
- probably would be dispersed in North Atlantic ship-* General purpose forces assigned to the Soviet Nothern Fleet.
Assumes that 60 percent of general purpose submarines, 70 percent ping lanes for reconnaissance and attacks on NATO
of surface combatants, and 85 percent of naval aircraft would be shipping and naval targets of opportunity. Alterna-
available after four lays of preparation. See paragraphs 102 and 103 tively a few might lay mines in confined waters near
and table 11-8 in chapter II for information concerning the normal NATO naval bases and ports. Others might patrol off
peacetime availability of Soviet naval forces. Some of these units major NATO naval bases to report on NATO move-
could also be used in support of operations against northern Norway.
Does not include two cruise missile and eight torpedo attack ments and attack major warships.
submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial
wartime deployment, some 20 submarines would
probably be positioned in the Atlantic astride NATO's
continue to concentrate their efforts in the Norwegian
and arets Sa.'sea lines of communication to attack NA TO warships
and Barents Sea.' and those convoys or ships carrying equipment for US
Ui6-Onerations_Sou.th_oIIeland Army divisions in the initial phase of a war. The
number of Soviet submarines dedicated to this effort
tie So-ies would depend upon the number of carriers which the
Soviets would believe likely to deploy to the Norwe-
sIn view of the foregoing, the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, notes that the allocation of specific numbers and classes 6 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency;
of Soviet submarines to specific tasks and ocean areas in para- the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
graphs 166-190 does not necessarily represent a high-confidence State; and the Director, National Security Agency.
judgment of most probable Soviet courses of action. The inherent
flexibilit y of naval warfare and the range of options available to a " The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
force as large as the Soviet Navy leads him to caution that other Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
initial force allocations may be equally likely. Navy.
IV-35
c ret