Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top eecel neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the ously-together with the problems of coordination Norwegian Sea before they could launch their missiles. with the land and strategic forces-all act to reduce 160. The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and Barents Seas and their approaches probably would tack by the Northern Fleet against all major NATO and moet ofeaaNrther proaces prbmarineswd naval formations throughout the North Atlantic. As a involve most of the Northern Fleet's submarines and result, the schedule for prehostilities deployment and virtually all of the surface forces and aircraft in an the level of deployment would probably be a compro- effort to exclude NATO forces from the area. The mise between the requirements for stealth and those Soviets probably also plan submarine and air oper- for war-fighting effectiveness. ations against NATO naval forces as they exit their bases in Europe and possibly against SSBNs from US 164. Because of range and time-on-station con- bases as well. In addition, at least some submarines straints on naval strike aircraft and the vulnerability of would attack shipping engaged in resupply and rein- Soviet surface combatants when operating out of area, forcement of Europe early in a war." the Soviet attack submarine force would be the princi- pal element for sustained operations in the North 16k. Soviet plans for controlling the Norwegian and Atlantic. The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and torpedo attack submarines in the Northern of a deployment in depth. the Fleet, but about 40 percent are in various stages of Soviets plan to weaken or defeat NATO's naval forces repair or workup at any one time. Thus, about 80 in the Norwegian Sea or approaching the area from submarines (with varying degrees of combat effective- the United States and the United Kingdom by succes- ness) would be available for operations at the outset of sive and coordinated assaults by submarines, strike hostilities. If about 10 of these submarines continued aircraft, and surface combatant ships. to be committed to operations in the Mediterranean 162. Soviet naval operations in the Norwegian Sea, and the Soviets did not augment their forces there its approaches, and other Atlantic Ocean areas would during a period of rising tension, some 70 submarines probably be preceded by deployments before the would be available for operations in the Atlantic. (See onset of hostilities in Central Europe, although the table IV-9.) This force would be subjected to heavy extent of such deployments is not clear. If the Soviets demands in wartime, and the Soviets probably would optimized for covertness, they would risk not having not have as many attack submarines as they deem most of their units in position when hostilities began. If necessary to. perform all important naval missions. forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early and Strategy and Operations clear indications of coming conflict, possibly to the 165. We do not know precisely how the Soviets detriment of Pact operations in Central Europe. In would apportion their naval forces among their several addition, the Soviets no doubt recognize that NATO tasks in the initial stages of a war with NATO. naval bases in the United Kingdom are located closer than those of the Northern Fleet to the most important choke points, such as the G-I-UK gap, and that NATO aviation reinforcement to Iceland and Norway could We recognize that Soviet naval deployments could be be accomplished more quickly than Soviet naval forces largely contingent on NATO operations at the outset could move to their intended operational areas. of hostilities. If the Soviets were to perceive that 163. There appears to be a conflict between the NATO did not intend to send aircraft carriers into or Soviet desire to strike preemptively every major near the Norwegian Sea, for example, large numbers NATO naval formation in the North Atlantic and the of submarines could be dedicated to missions else- strong possibility that war would begin before Soviet where. Even if NATO carriers deployed into or near Northern Fleet preparations were complete. Most the Norwegian Sea, Soviet force allocations could shift, Soviet exercises since 1970 reflect the latter expecta- depending on the outcome of the initial engagements. tion. The difficulties of coordinating such an attack For example, successful Soviet attacks early in a war using submarine, surface, and air forces simultane- on NATO carriers and amphibious task groups operat- ing north of the G-I-UK gap might encourage the See paragraphs 142-149 of chapter 11and paragraphs 168 and Soviets to take a more active subsequent role in the 169 of this chapter for differing agency views on Soviet plans and Atlantic south of Iceland. On the other hand, should capabilities for interdiction of sea lines of communication. their forces suffer a serious reverse, they would likely IV-34
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.