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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and
Finnmark to effect early linkup. The Troms area is central Norway, probably to clear a path for naval
more heavily defended, the terrain is more difficult strike, reconnaissance, and ASW aircraft flying against
than in Finnmark, and larger forces would be required NATO carrier forces and submarines in the Norwe-
to seize and hold it. Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and amphibious assault elements based air defenses, they would route transiting aircraft
ashore, but suitable port facilities would be required north of North Cape and then down the center of the
and the transport of these reinforcements from bases Norwegian Sea. Such routing would reduce the expo-
in the northern Leningrad Military District would take sure of the aircraft to land-based air defenses, but it
two to three days and would need naval escort. would decrease significantly the combat radius of the
152. Some 1 ,000 to 20,000 men in Soviet naval aircraft, the time they could spend in their operating
infantry, grouyd forces, and small airborne units areas, and the promptness of anticarrier strikes. It
would be likely to participate in operations against seems unlikely that many LRA bombers or even
northern Norway during the first week of conflict. tactical aircraft would be made available for strikes
This force could be reinforced, but the movement of against Norwegian air defenes, given the large re-
additional Soviet ground forces northward has not quirement for these aircraft in the Central Region.
been evident in Soviet exercise activity in the D. Naval Operations in the North Atlantic
northwest.
153. The Soviet motorized rifle regiments from the 157. In wartime the Soviets evidently expect NATO
two northern divisions are specially structured and to deploy aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines,
equipped for operations in the Arctic. Although these and large numbers of attack submarines against Soviet
units can easily traverse the terrain in northern Nor- surface and submarine forces operating in the North
way, lines of communication over land would be Atlantic. In addition,
difficult to maintain because only one major road runs they believe NATO would attempt amp ib-
through the area. There is some evidence indicating ious landings in northern Norway and use the Norwe-
that the.Soviets plan to alleviate this shortcoming by gian Sea as a launch zone for carrier-based strikes
resupplying ground forces by sea: against the USSR. They also expect NATO to establish
antisubmarine barriers in the Greenland-Iceland-
154. We do not believe that the Soviets would United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap and off northern Nor-
attempt a large-scale airborne assault in northern ytonreyent-assae_ofS.oviet_submarines
Norway because the demands for air transport else-
where against NATO probably would preclude early
use of a formation as large as a complete airborne
division. The Soviets, however, might attempt to insert
small teams to sabotage transportation, communica- 158. The Norwegian Sea, especially its southern
tions, and intelligence facilities. half ending at the G-I-UK gap, is central to Soviet
naval strategy in the Atlantic. While the Soviets clearly
Air Operations expect naval engagements throughout the North At-
155. Air support for the Soviet ground forces in lantic, they reckon that by far the heaviest combat
Finnmark would come primarily from the some 120 would occur near and inside a maritime theater of
Frontal Aviation ground attack and reconnaissance military operations (MTVD) which they evidently
aircraft in the Leningrad Military District. Although would establish north of the G-I-UK gap. Soviet
none of these tactical aircraft are based in the north, operations in this MTVD would be intended to pre-
they have deployed during exercises to bases in the vent NATO naval incursions into an ocean area the
Murmansk area. There are no Frontal Aviation fighter Soviets consider critical to successful defense of their
regiments in the Leningrad Military District, although homeland, especially the Kola Peninsula.
fighters from three regiments of the Soviet strategic air 159. Soviet strategy calls for the early establishment
defense forces on the Kola Peninsula could provide air of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their
cover to a dlistance of about 200 kilometers over approaches. Operations farther into the North AtlanticNorway. to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious
156. We have some evidence that the Soviets would task groups and to divert NATO naval strength are
use LRA bombers in an attempt to destroy or suppress probably also planned. The Soviets would attempt to
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.