Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and Finnmark to effect early linkup. The Troms area is central Norway, probably to clear a path for naval more heavily defended, the terrain is more difficult strike, reconnaissance, and ASW aircraft flying against than in Finnmark, and larger forces would be required NATO carrier forces and submarines in the Norwe- to seize and hold it. Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and amphibious assault elements based air defenses, they would route transiting aircraft ashore, but suitable port facilities would be required north of North Cape and then down the center of the and the transport of these reinforcements from bases Norwegian Sea. Such routing would reduce the expo- in the northern Leningrad Military District would take sure of the aircraft to land-based air defenses, but it two to three days and would need naval escort. would decrease significantly the combat radius of the 152. Some 1 ,000 to 20,000 men in Soviet naval aircraft, the time they could spend in their operating infantry, grouyd forces, and small airborne units areas, and the promptness of anticarrier strikes. It would be likely to participate in operations against seems unlikely that many LRA bombers or even northern Norway during the first week of conflict. tactical aircraft would be made available for strikes This force could be reinforced, but the movement of against Norwegian air defenes, given the large re- additional Soviet ground forces northward has not quirement for these aircraft in the Central Region. been evident in Soviet exercise activity in the D. Naval Operations in the North Atlantic northwest. 153. The Soviet motorized rifle regiments from the 157. In wartime the Soviets evidently expect NATO two northern divisions are specially structured and to deploy aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines, equipped for operations in the Arctic. Although these and large numbers of attack submarines against Soviet units can easily traverse the terrain in northern Nor- surface and submarine forces operating in the North way, lines of communication over land would be Atlantic. In addition, difficult to maintain because only one major road runs they believe NATO would attempt amp ib- through the area. There is some evidence indicating ious landings in northern Norway and use the Norwe- that the.Soviets plan to alleviate this shortcoming by gian Sea as a launch zone for carrier-based strikes resupplying ground forces by sea: against the USSR. They also expect NATO to establish antisubmarine barriers in the Greenland-Iceland- 154. We do not believe that the Soviets would United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap and off northern Nor- attempt a large-scale airborne assault in northern ytonreyent-assae_ofS.oviet_submarines Norway because the demands for air transport else- where against NATO probably would preclude early use of a formation as large as a complete airborne division. The Soviets, however, might attempt to insert small teams to sabotage transportation, communica- 158. The Norwegian Sea, especially its southern tions, and intelligence facilities. half ending at the G-I-UK gap, is central to Soviet naval strategy in the Atlantic. While the Soviets clearly Air Operations expect naval engagements throughout the North At- 155. Air support for the Soviet ground forces in lantic, they reckon that by far the heaviest combat Finnmark would come primarily from the some 120 would occur near and inside a maritime theater of Frontal Aviation ground attack and reconnaissance military operations (MTVD) which they evidently aircraft in the Leningrad Military District. Although would establish north of the G-I-UK gap. Soviet none of these tactical aircraft are based in the north, operations in this MTVD would be intended to pre- they have deployed during exercises to bases in the vent NATO naval incursions into an ocean area the Murmansk area. There are no Frontal Aviation fighter Soviets consider critical to successful defense of their regiments in the Leningrad Military District, although homeland, especially the Kola Peninsula. fighters from three regiments of the Soviet strategic air 159. Soviet strategy calls for the early establishment defense forces on the Kola Peninsula could provide air of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their cover to a dlistance of about 200 kilometers over approaches. Operations farther into the North AtlanticNorway. to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious 156. We have some evidence that the Soviets would task groups and to divert NATO naval strength are use LRA bombers in an attempt to destroy or suppress probably also planned. The Soviets would attempt to IV-33
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.