Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and
Finnmark to effect early linkup. The Troms area is central Norway, probably to clear a path for naval
more heavily defended, the terrain is more difficult strike, reconnaissance, and ASW aircraft flying against
than in Finnmark, and larger forces would be required NATO carrier forces and submarines in the Norwe-
to seize and hold it. Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and amphibious assault elements based air defenses, they would route transiting aircraft
ashore, but suitable port facilities would be required north of North Cape and then down the center of the
and the transport of these reinforcements from bases Norwegian Sea. Such routing would reduce the expo-
in the northern Leningrad Military District would take sure of the aircraft to land-based air defenses, but it
two to three days and would need naval escort. would decrease significantly the combat radius of the
152. Some 1 ,000 to 20,000 men in Soviet naval aircraft, the time they could spend in their operating
infantry, grouyd forces, and small airborne units areas, and the promptness of anticarrier strikes. It
would be likely to participate in operations against seems unlikely that many LRA bombers or even
northern Norway during the first week of conflict. tactical aircraft would be made available for strikes
This force could be reinforced, but the movement of against Norwegian air defenes, given the large re-
additional Soviet ground forces northward has not quirement for these aircraft in the Central Region.
been evident in Soviet exercise activity in the D. Naval Operations in the North Atlantic
northwest.
153. The Soviet motorized rifle regiments from the 157. In wartime the Soviets evidently expect NATO
two northern divisions are specially structured and to deploy aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines,
equipped for operations in the Arctic. Although these and large numbers of attack submarines against Soviet
units can easily traverse the terrain in northern Nor- surface and submarine forces operating in the North
way, lines of communication over land would be Atlantic. In addition,
difficult to maintain because only one major road runs they believe NATO would attempt amp ib-
through the area. There is some evidence indicating ious landings in northern Norway and use the Norwe-
that the.Soviets plan to alleviate this shortcoming by gian Sea as a launch zone for carrier-based strikes
resupplying ground forces by sea: against the USSR. They also expect NATO to establish
antisubmarine barriers in the Greenland-Iceland-
154. We do not believe that the Soviets would United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap and off northern Nor-
attempt a large-scale airborne assault in northern ytonreyent-assae_ofS.oviet_submarines
Norway because the demands for air transport else-
where against NATO probably would preclude early
use of a formation as large as a complete airborne
division. The Soviets, however, might attempt to insert
small teams to sabotage transportation, communica- 158. The Norwegian Sea, especially its southern
tions, and intelligence facilities. half ending at the G-I-UK gap, is central to Soviet
naval strategy in the Atlantic. While the Soviets clearly
Air Operations expect naval engagements throughout the North At-
155. Air support for the Soviet ground forces in lantic, they reckon that by far the heaviest combat
Finnmark would come primarily from the some 120 would occur near and inside a maritime theater of
Frontal Aviation ground attack and reconnaissance military operations (MTVD) which they evidently
aircraft in the Leningrad Military District. Although would establish north of the G-I-UK gap. Soviet
none of these tactical aircraft are based in the north, operations in this MTVD would be intended to pre-
they have deployed during exercises to bases in the vent NATO naval incursions into an ocean area the
Murmansk area. There are no Frontal Aviation fighter Soviets consider critical to successful defense of their
regiments in the Leningrad Military District, although homeland, especially the Kola Peninsula.
fighters from three regiments of the Soviet strategic air 159. Soviet strategy calls for the early establishment
defense forces on the Kola Peninsula could provide air of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their
cover to a dlistance of about 200 kilometers over approaches. Operations farther into the North AtlanticNorway. to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious
156. We have some evidence that the Soviets would task groups and to divert NATO naval strength are
use LRA bombers in an attempt to destroy or suppress probably also planned. The Soviets would attempt to
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