Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top CSet Naval Operations those Soviet theater forces which are likely to be allocated for operations in the Northwestern TVD. 146. During a period of tension before a war with NATO, the Soviet Northern Fleet would establish 148. Soviet amphibious ships carrying up to a regi- surface, submarine, and air patrols in the Norwegian ment of Soviet naval infantry probably would attempt and Barents Seas and attempt to detect and track to seize limited objectives along the northern Norwe- Western forces in nearby waters. As the likelihood of a gian coast. After the naval infantry had secured a conflict increased, defensive minefields probably suitable port, followup Soviet ground forces from the would be established along the sea approaches to the Pechenga area could be landed from merchant vessels. Soviet coast- 149. We do not anticipate any large-scale amphib- 147. with the opening ious operations because the Soviets are limited in their of hostilities, the Northern Fleet would attack Western assault lift capacity and their capability to overcome submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious task determined resistance from the beach. Initial amphib- forces detected approaching the Barents and Nprwe- ious operations probably would be confided to the gian Seas." Some LRA bombers and Frontal Aviation coast of Finnmark, under conditions suitable for an fighter-bombers-supplemented by naval bombers, early linkup with the ground forces. The Soviets, when available-probably would strike NATO naval however, would probably commit a large number of facilities, airbases, communications sites and surveil- smaller combatants to an escort role in support of lance posts in northern Norway. Table IV-8 shows operations in northern Norway. " Section D of this chapter, beginning at paragraph 157, discusses Ground Operations in Northern Norway soviet naval operations in these areas. 150. Because of the limited availability of ground forces and tactical aircraft in the northern Leningrad Table IV-8 Military District and the high priority given to naval Soviet Theater Forces Estimated To Be Available missions against NATO naval strike forces, we believe for Use in the Northwestern Theater of an initial Soviet ground offensive would be limited to Military Operations a the Finnmark area. Potentially strong NATO resist- January 1979 ance beyond Finnmark and the risk of drawing in far --- - ---_ - greater forces than exist in the Kola Peninsula area Divisionsa would probably deter major Soviet ground offensives Tank .............................. ................ .... .......- Motorized Rifle 8 in the north until an acceptable outcome in Central Europe had been achieved. Moreover, the better Tactical Aircraft Fighter-Bomber 90 defended-and more defensible-Norwegian territory Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare .30 south of Finnmark is at the extrenie limits of Soviet General Purpose Naval Forcesc tactical air coverage. Amphibious Ships" ..-........ .. 10 151. . initial ground Naval Infantry Regiments ... _._........................_.......... 1 NavalInfantryRegiments. .... .. operations against northern Norway probably would Includes Soviet ground and "airforces in the Leningrad Military be limited to the Finnmark area and would be made District and those of the Soviet Northern Fleet which mighi be used by elements of the two Soviet divisions at Pechenga in the Northwestern TVD. Some LRA and naval aircraft could also and Kandalaksha. We believe that subsequent oper- be diverted from operations in other areas for use in this theater. ations could extend as far south as Tromso and Narvik. " One airborne division located in the Leningrad Military District Seizure of Norwegian bases in the Troms area early in could be used in this theater or in other theaters the war would be important to the Soviets because it .Assumes that 70 perment of the amphibious ships would be would provide greater flank security for their naval available given four (lays of preparation. See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table It-8 in chapter 11 for information concerning the small-scale airborne or amphibious raids against these normal peacetime availability of Soviet naval forces. bases in an attempt to disrupt NATO operations. We d Some general purpose submarines, surface combatants, and would also expect bombing attacks against them by naval aircraft from the Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not support operations in the Northwestern TVD, but most would be expect initial large-scale airborne or amphibious as- used against NATO forces in the North Atlantic. (See table IV-9). sault intis are-scale ore o adebus as- saults in this area because of the lack of adequate air -smet-- cover, airlift, and amphibious lift, and because of the IV-32 Top rt
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.