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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“The Advance”37 pages

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
-T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as more important than a modest augmenta-
before the outbreak of hostilities. The difference in tion of the Mediterranean Squadron.
judgment turns on whether the main purpose of the
Black Sea Fleet is to provide air and ASW defense for C. The Initial Campaign in the Northwestern
operations against the Turkish Straits, or whether it is Theater of Military Operations
to augment the Mediterranean Squadron.
144. The holders of the first view believe the Fleet 145. Initial Soviet objectives in the Northwestern
is in excess of requirements for the defense of local TVD center on ensuring freedom of action and unin-
waters in the Black Sea and for offensive operations hibited access to the open ocean for the Soviet naval
against Turkey and judge that, in any event, augmen- ships and aircraft and maintaining the forward de-
tation of the Mediterranean Squadron would not fense of the extensive complex of naval bases and
jeopardize an assault on the Straits. They argue that strategic installations located on the Kola Peninsula.
the time required to seize and clear the Straits and (See figure IV-6.) Initial operations by Soviet land
general uncertainty attending such an operation mili- forces probably would be limited to northern Norway.
tate against the Pact's holding its forces in the Black We have no evidence indicating that the Soviets plan
Sea, risking their exclusion from use in the Mediterra- for a general offensive against Finland or Sweden
nean. The holders of the second view, on the other early in a war. The Leningrad Military District-with
hand, point out that naval units sortied during periods its wartime front organization-is intended to defend
of tension could be trapped in the Mediterranean, the city of Leningrad and related areas in the Baltic, in
where they would be highly vulnerable to attack. addition to the operations in the north discussed in this
They judge that Pact planners would view seizure of section.
Illustrative Soviet Operations in the Northwestern TVD Figure IV-6
Probable area for amphibious assaults
a Barents Sea
Norwegian Sea
Possible airborne
or amphibious raids r 4 ARK
and air attacks Pechei
N RWAY .:Ground,
. operations~,
TROMS7 Murmansk
PFEN)NSUL A
rvik U.S.S.R.
LENINGRAD 9
Bod FINLAND .
SWEDEN MILITARY Kandalaksha
DISTRICTS
(543933)
577641 1-79 CIA
IV-31
T66-eeret

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.