Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Indian Air Force”5 pages
-T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as more important than a modest augmenta- before the outbreak of hostilities. The difference in tion of the Mediterranean Squadron. judgment turns on whether the main purpose of the Black Sea Fleet is to provide air and ASW defense for C. The Initial Campaign in the Northwestern operations against the Turkish Straits, or whether it is Theater of Military Operations to augment the Mediterranean Squadron. 144. The holders of the first view believe the Fleet 145. Initial Soviet objectives in the Northwestern is in excess of requirements for the defense of local TVD center on ensuring freedom of action and unin- waters in the Black Sea and for offensive operations hibited access to the open ocean for the Soviet naval against Turkey and judge that, in any event, augmen- ships and aircraft and maintaining the forward de- tation of the Mediterranean Squadron would not fense of the extensive complex of naval bases and jeopardize an assault on the Straits. They argue that strategic installations located on the Kola Peninsula. the time required to seize and clear the Straits and (See figure IV-6.) Initial operations by Soviet land general uncertainty attending such an operation mili- forces probably would be limited to northern Norway. tate against the Pact's holding its forces in the Black We have no evidence indicating that the Soviets plan Sea, risking their exclusion from use in the Mediterra- for a general offensive against Finland or Sweden nean. The holders of the second view, on the other early in a war. The Leningrad Military District-with hand, point out that naval units sortied during periods its wartime front organization-is intended to defend of tension could be trapped in the Mediterranean, the city of Leningrad and related areas in the Baltic, in where they would be highly vulnerable to attack. addition to the operations in the north discussed in this They judge that Pact planners would view seizure of section. Illustrative Soviet Operations in the Northwestern TVD Figure IV-6 Probable area for amphibious assaults a Barents Sea Norwegian Sea Possible airborne or amphibious raids r 4 ARK and air attacks Pechei N RWAY .:Ground, . operations~, TROMS7 Murmansk PFEN)NSUL A rvik U.S.S.R. LENINGRAD 9 Bod FINLAND . SWEDEN MILITARY Kandalaksha DISTRICTS (543933) 577641 1-79 CIA IV-31 T66-eeret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.