“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
attack at the outset of hostilities. In wartime the other gence evidence and other considerations which bear
submarines probably could monitor Western naval on this question include the following:
movements near major choke points and possibly near - We have no evidenceL
some of the main NATO naval bases, of plans to augment the surface force in the
139. By itself, however, the submarine force nor- Mediterranean during a period of tension before
mally deployed in the Mediterranean is not large the outbreak of hostilities
enough to attack all Western aircraft carriers and
other potential NATO naval targets there at one time.
Reinforcement from the Northern Fleet would take
almost two weeks for nuclear-powered submarines-
over three weeks for diesels-and provide NATO with
warning indications if conducted before war broke
out. Because of competing tasks elsewhere, limitations
on the availability of submarines, and logistical con-
straints, we estimate that the submarine formation in - Of some 60 principal surface combatants typi-
the Mediterranean probably would not be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities. nine are normally deployed to the Medi-
terranean.
140. There is evidence that Soviet submarines in
the Mediterranean would expend torpedoes only in - The Soviets have sortied major surface warships
self-defense or against high-value targets, especially from the Black Sea to augment the Mediterra-
aircraft carrier task groups, amphibious task groups, nean Squadron during major fleet exercises and
and US nuclear-powered submarines. Soviet subma- in times of crisis. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli
rines, because of their lack of survivable replenish- war, for example, the Soviets almost doubled the
ment points, would probably not, as a matter of size of the Mediterranean force and demon-
course, fire their torpedoes against merchant ships in strated the capability to augment the force
the Mediterranean until they had succeeded in their quickly.
attacks on high-value targets or were returning to base. -Such an act would be a clear warning indicator,
141. Operations by Surface Ships in the Medi- and it could be counterproductive, depending on
terranean. Soviet surface forces normally in the Medi- NATO's reaction. On the other hand, it might be
terranean consist of seven to nine combatants and 25 viewed by the Soviets as a way to demonstrate
auxiliaries. These forces would conduct ASW oper- their resolve during a crisis.
ations and serve as target spotters and trackers for - The Soviets recognize NATO's capability to
strikes by submarines, aircraft, and other surface ships. block the Turkish Straits, and must consider that
They would also provide command and control sup- such operations could occur early in a war.
port for Soviet submarines and aircraft. Typically, the Consequently, Soviet planners could not count on
forces include one or two ships armed with cruise unobstructed passage to or from the Mediterra-
missiles. The remaining ships are armed with guns of nean after the oubreak of hostilities.
76-mm to 152-mm caliber and torpedoes. Many have
air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that the Mediterranean Squad-
mode. In addition, all are equipped with a variety of ron probably would be augmented by at least a few,
ASW sensors and weapons. These ships almost cer- and possibly up to 12, of the large surface combatants
tainly would be operating in an environment in which in the Black Sea-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kyndas, and
NATO had air superiority, however, and, together Kashins-before the outbreak of hostilities. Others
with Soviet submarines, would be the targets for some believe ' that the Soviets wr"ld deploy no more than a
30 NATO submarines.
" The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
142. There are divergent views within the Intelli- Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director
gence Community on whether or the extent to which of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.
the Soviets would augment their surface forces in the 2 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency
Mediterranean during a period of tension preceding and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and llesearch, Depart-
the outbreak of hostilities. All agree that the intelli- mnent of State.
IV-30
Th-et