Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
attack at the outset of hostilities. In wartime the other gence evidence and other considerations which bear submarines probably could monitor Western naval on this question include the following: movements near major choke points and possibly near - We have no evidenceL some of the main NATO naval bases, of plans to augment the surface force in the 139. By itself, however, the submarine force nor- Mediterranean during a period of tension before mally deployed in the Mediterranean is not large the outbreak of hostilities enough to attack all Western aircraft carriers and other potential NATO naval targets there at one time. Reinforcement from the Northern Fleet would take almost two weeks for nuclear-powered submarines- over three weeks for diesels-and provide NATO with warning indications if conducted before war broke out. Because of competing tasks elsewhere, limitations on the availability of submarines, and logistical con- straints, we estimate that the submarine formation in - Of some 60 principal surface combatants typi- the Mediterranean probably would not be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities. nine are normally deployed to the Medi- terranean. 140. There is evidence that Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean would expend torpedoes only in - The Soviets have sortied major surface warships self-defense or against high-value targets, especially from the Black Sea to augment the Mediterra- aircraft carrier task groups, amphibious task groups, nean Squadron during major fleet exercises and and US nuclear-powered submarines. Soviet subma- in times of crisis. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli rines, because of their lack of survivable replenish- war, for example, the Soviets almost doubled the ment points, would probably not, as a matter of size of the Mediterranean force and demon- course, fire their torpedoes against merchant ships in strated the capability to augment the force the Mediterranean until they had succeeded in their quickly. attacks on high-value targets or were returning to base. -Such an act would be a clear warning indicator, 141. Operations by Surface Ships in the Medi- and it could be counterproductive, depending on terranean. Soviet surface forces normally in the Medi- NATO's reaction. On the other hand, it might be terranean consist of seven to nine combatants and 25 viewed by the Soviets as a way to demonstrate auxiliaries. These forces would conduct ASW oper- their resolve during a crisis. ations and serve as target spotters and trackers for - The Soviets recognize NATO's capability to strikes by submarines, aircraft, and other surface ships. block the Turkish Straits, and must consider that They would also provide command and control sup- such operations could occur early in a war. port for Soviet submarines and aircraft. Typically, the Consequently, Soviet planners could not count on forces include one or two ships armed with cruise unobstructed passage to or from the Mediterra- missiles. The remaining ships are armed with guns of nean after the oubreak of hostilities. 76-mm to 152-mm caliber and torpedoes. Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that the Mediterranean Squad- mode. In addition, all are equipped with a variety of ron probably would be augmented by at least a few, ASW sensors and weapons. These ships almost cer- and possibly up to 12, of the large surface combatants tainly would be operating in an environment in which in the Black Sea-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kyndas, and NATO had air superiority, however, and, together Kashins-before the outbreak of hostilities. Others with Soviet submarines, would be the targets for some believe ' that the Soviets wr"ld deploy no more than a 30 NATO submarines. " The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence 142. There are divergent views within the Intelli- Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director gence Community on whether or the extent to which of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. the Soviets would augment their surface forces in the 2 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency Mediterranean during a period of tension preceding and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and llesearch, Depart- the outbreak of hostilities. All agree that the intelli- mnent of State. IV-30 Th-et
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.