Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

attack at the outset of hostilities. In wartime the other gence evidence and other considerations which bear
submarines probably could monitor Western naval on this question include the following:
movements near major choke points and possibly near - We have no evidenceL
some of the main NATO naval bases, of plans to augment the surface force in the
139. By itself, however, the submarine force nor- Mediterranean during a period of tension before
mally deployed in the Mediterranean is not large the outbreak of hostilities
enough to attack all Western aircraft carriers and
other potential NATO naval targets there at one time.
Reinforcement from the Northern Fleet would take
almost two weeks for nuclear-powered submarines-
over three weeks for diesels-and provide NATO with
warning indications if conducted before war broke
out. Because of competing tasks elsewhere, limitations
on the availability of submarines, and logistical con-
straints, we estimate that the submarine formation in - Of some 60 principal surface combatants typi-
the Mediterranean probably would not be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities. nine are normally deployed to the Medi-
terranean.
140. There is evidence that Soviet submarines in
the Mediterranean would expend torpedoes only in - The Soviets have sortied major surface warships
self-defense or against high-value targets, especially from the Black Sea to augment the Mediterra-
aircraft carrier task groups, amphibious task groups, nean Squadron during major fleet exercises and
and US nuclear-powered submarines. Soviet subma- in times of crisis. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli
rines, because of their lack of survivable replenish- war, for example, the Soviets almost doubled the
ment points, would probably not, as a matter of size of the Mediterranean force and demon-
course, fire their torpedoes against merchant ships in strated the capability to augment the force
the Mediterranean until they had succeeded in their quickly.
attacks on high-value targets or were returning to base. -Such an act would be a clear warning indicator,
141. Operations by Surface Ships in the Medi- and it could be counterproductive, depending on
terranean. Soviet surface forces normally in the Medi- NATO's reaction. On the other hand, it might be
terranean consist of seven to nine combatants and 25 viewed by the Soviets as a way to demonstrate
auxiliaries. These forces would conduct ASW oper- their resolve during a crisis.
ations and serve as target spotters and trackers for - The Soviets recognize NATO's capability to
strikes by submarines, aircraft, and other surface ships. block the Turkish Straits, and must consider that
They would also provide command and control sup- such operations could occur early in a war.
port for Soviet submarines and aircraft. Typically, the Consequently, Soviet planners could not count on
forces include one or two ships armed with cruise unobstructed passage to or from the Mediterra-
missiles. The remaining ships are armed with guns of nean after the oubreak of hostilities.
76-mm to 152-mm caliber and torpedoes. Many have
air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that the Mediterranean Squad-
mode. In addition, all are equipped with a variety of ron probably would be augmented by at least a few,
ASW sensors and weapons. These ships almost cer- and possibly up to 12, of the large surface combatants
tainly would be operating in an environment in which in the Black Sea-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kyndas, and
NATO had air superiority, however, and, together Kashins-before the outbreak of hostilities. Others
with Soviet submarines, would be the targets for some believe ' that the Soviets wr"ld deploy no more than a
30 NATO submarines.
" The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
142. There are divergent views within the Intelli- Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director
gence Community on whether or the extent to which of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.
the Soviets would augment their surface forces in the 2 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency
Mediterranean during a period of tension preceding and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and llesearch, Depart-
the outbreak of hostilities. All agree that the intelli- mnent of State.
IV-30
Th-et