Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Table IV-7 Warsaw Pact Tactical Aircraft Available for Use in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations January 1979 In the Balkans- In the -- Southwestern Soviet NSWP USSR b Total Fighters ................................ 135 60 315 510 Fighter-Bombers ......................... 45 165 125 335 Light Bombers..... .................... 30 - - 30 Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Air- craft . .... ........................ 35 60 105 200 Total ....... .......... ............ 245 285 545 1,075 Soviet tactical air forces in Hungary and the tactical air components of-the Romanian and Bulgarian Air Forces. An additional 435 intercepter aircraft are assigned to the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian National Air Defense Commands. b Soviet tactical aircraft based in the Odessa, Kiev, and Transcaucasus Military Districts. '5ECMW. 134. The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages of such an attack are largely offset by the Fleet is also possible. fact that Soviet strike aircraft would have to take off 136. Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships, entire Mediterranean from Black Sea airfields. Bad- moreover, depend on centralized command and con- trol from shore and would generate a high volume of ger aircraft can carry out attacks in most of the eastern specialized communications. These actions could alert - from Black Sea or NSWP airfields. The NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean of the availability of airfields in a friendly North African imoending___perations._ country to stage or recovery would allow the Soviets to aors inpoitonoatakarc improve the effectiveness of air operations in theforces in a position to attack aircraft entire Mediterranean. At the present time, however, carriers should not await the arrival of other forces. n t Mediane. a e pre t t e hover, no North African airfields are available to the Soviets. 137. whenever possible, the Soviets would use 20 to 40 aircraft to attack an important target such as an aircraft carrier task group. This number would be designed to overwhelm NATO air 135. Operations by Naval Aircraft in the Medi- defenses and achieve the six to 10 hits which the terranean. While the most immediate threat would Soviets believe are necessary to disable an aircraft come from Soviet ships and submarines already de- carrier using conventional warheads. played in the Mediterranean, numerically the most sizable threat to NATO's naval forces there would come from missile-equipped Soviet strike aircraft, despite the fact that they would be operating without fighter escort. In a conventional war the USSR-based 138. Submarine Operations in the Mediterra- Black Sea Air Force could sortie about 40 ASM- nean. The Soviets normally keep eight to 10 subma- carrying strike aircraft, with as many as 80 missiles, rines, including two cruise missile units, in the Medi- which could attack throughout the eastern Mediterra- terranean in peacetime. The cruise missile submarines nean. The Soviets would probably hold another 20 usually keep a Western aircraft carrier within range of ASM carriers with 40 missiles in reserve as a hedge their missiles and probably would be in a position to against escalation to nuclear war. Soviet exercises and training indicates that any reinforcement of the Black oSee paragraphs 178 and 179 of chapter ITfor a discussion of the Sea Air Force would most likely come from the Baltic Backfire's capabilities. IV-29 TaSoecret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.