Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Table IV-7
Warsaw Pact Tactical Aircraft Available for Use in the
Southwestern Theater of Military Operations
January 1979
In the Balkans- In the
-- Southwestern
Soviet NSWP USSR b Total
Fighters ................................ 135 60 315 510
Fighter-Bombers ......................... 45 165 125 335
Light Bombers..... .................... 30 - - 30
Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Air-
craft . .... ........................ 35 60 105 200
Total ....... .......... ............ 245 285 545 1,075
Soviet tactical air forces in Hungary and the tactical air components of-the Romanian and Bulgarian Air
Forces. An additional 435 intercepter aircraft are assigned to the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian
National Air Defense Commands.
b Soviet tactical aircraft based in the Odessa, Kiev, and Transcaucasus Military Districts.
'5ECMW.
134. The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages of such an attack are largely offset by the Fleet is also possible.
fact that Soviet strike aircraft would have to take off 136. Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the
several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships, entire Mediterranean from Black Sea airfields. Bad-
moreover, depend on centralized command and con-
trol from shore and would generate a high volume of ger aircraft can carry out attacks in most of the eastern
specialized communications. These actions could alert - from Black Sea or NSWP airfields. The
NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean of the availability of airfields in a friendly North African
imoending___perations._ country to stage or recovery would allow the Soviets to
aors inpoitonoatakarc improve the effectiveness of air operations in theforces in a position to attack aircraft entire Mediterranean. At the present time, however,
carriers should not await the arrival of other forces. n t Mediane. a e pre t t e hover,
no North African airfields are available to the Soviets.
137.
whenever possible, the Soviets
would use 20 to 40 aircraft to attack an important
target such as an aircraft carrier task group. This
number would be designed to overwhelm NATO air
135. Operations by Naval Aircraft in the Medi- defenses and achieve the six to 10 hits which the
terranean. While the most immediate threat would Soviets believe are necessary to disable an aircraft
come from Soviet ships and submarines already de- carrier using conventional warheads.
played in the Mediterranean, numerically the most
sizable threat to NATO's naval forces there would
come from missile-equipped Soviet strike aircraft,
despite the fact that they would be operating without
fighter escort. In a conventional war the USSR-based 138. Submarine Operations in the Mediterra-
Black Sea Air Force could sortie about 40 ASM- nean. The Soviets normally keep eight to 10 subma-
carrying strike aircraft, with as many as 80 missiles, rines, including two cruise missile units, in the Medi-
which could attack throughout the eastern Mediterra- terranean in peacetime. The cruise missile submarines
nean. The Soviets would probably hold another 20 usually keep a Western aircraft carrier within range of
ASM carriers with 40 missiles in reserve as a hedge their missiles and probably would be in a position to
against escalation to nuclear war. Soviet exercises and
training indicates that any reinforcement of the Black oSee paragraphs 178 and 179 of chapter ITfor a discussion of the
Sea Air Force would most likely come from the Baltic Backfire's capabilities.
IV-29
TaSoecret