Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
Top e Table IV-6 defenses in southern Europe, thus permitting the overflight of Long Range Aviation and naval aircraft Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Esti- heading for the Mediterranean. The Pact may also mated To Be Available For Use in the Southwestern have plans to conduct a conventional air operation Theater of Military Operations a using tactical and LRA aircraft against NATO airfields January 1979 in the Mediterranean area, but their ability to conduct Soviet b NSWP c Total such an operation would be constrained by the concur- --- -rent requirement for LRA bombers to conduct an air Submarines offensive in Central Europe and by the limited num- Cruise Missile Units..................... - Euop a- by4d e Torpedo Attack Units ........... 16 2 18 her of Pact fighter-bombers in the Southwestern TVD. Principal Surface Combatants (See table IV-7.) Pact air support of the ground forces Helicopter Ships . 1 1 would probably be largely confined to key areas, such Cruisers .... ....... .......... 8 - 8 as the Turkish Straits. Destroyers ..................... 18 - 18 Amiious Ss ................... 9 1 3 131. Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean NavalAircraft would begin at the start of a war and would be aimed Strike Aircraft ........ .......... 78 - 78 primarily at the destruction of Western SSBNs and Reconnaissance/Electronic aircraft carriers. Forces used would consist of surface Warfare Aircraft .............. 10 - 10 and submarine units in the Mediterranean at the Tankers ........................... 11 - 11 Fighters/Fighter-Bombers 17 - 17 outset of hostilities, as well as Soviet naval and perhaps ASW Fixed-Wing Aircraft . 21 - 21 LRA aircraft operating from bases in the Soviet Union ASW/Reconnaissance Helicop- and possibly from NSWP countries. ters .................................. 54 5 59 Assumes that 60 percent of general purpose submarines, 70 132. Soviet naval deployment pat- percent of surface combatants, and 85 percent of naval aircraft terns indicate that the Soviets expect most activity by would be available with four lays of preparation. See paragraphs their surface forces to be concentrated in the Mediter- 102 and 103 and table 11-8 in chapter II for information concerning ranean east of Sicily the normal peacetime availability of Soviet naval forces. the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron, including some eight torpedo attack and two cruise missile submarines the Mediterranean Squadron almost certainly would normally deployed to the Mediterranean from the Northern Fleet. not occur before Pact operations began in other areas Not included are minor surface combatants, six reserve ships, and 32 of the theater. The Black Sea Fleet Air Force would reserve submarines. follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not include minor surface combatants. while free-fall bombers of Soviet Naval Aviation a Includes eight available units assigned to the Caspian Sea flotilla. (SNA) and tactical aircraft were suppressing NATO air defenses. Some LRA aircraft, especially missile- armed Blinders and Backfires, might participate in 129. Even with these more modern ships, the Soviet raids against carriers, although most of these aircraft fleet would be vulnerable to low-altitude attacks. The probably would be committed against Central Europe. current lack of emphasis on collective defense in training exercises suggests that Soviet naval air defense 133. Soviet surface and submarine forces continu- is based primarily on individual ship self-defense, ously monitor the positions of NATO carriers in the although missile-equipped ships probably are expected Mediterranean in peacetime. Judging by Soviet exer- to provide protection for less capable ships in close cises and reactions in crises, we would expect the company, as well as for themselves. Individual SAM- Soviets to intensify their surveillance before the out- equipped ships probably would be . able to defend break of hostilities and be prepared to attack immedi- against a few attackers at medium and high altitudes. ately after war broke out. Although not seen in Their defenses could be saturated, however, if many exercises for several years, there is evidence that the aircraft attacked simultaneously from different Soviets perceive the value of simultaneously executing directions. a missile attack from aircraft and surface ships and a missile and torpedo attack from submarines. They Initial Air and Naval Operations in the Mediterranean believe that such an attack would divide NATO 130. An important initial mission of Pact tactical air defenses, bring the highest concentration of fire to forces would be to suppress NATO's forward air bear, and provide the greatest probability of success. IV-28 lop ecre
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.