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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
the main part of Greece. However, considering the vital to sustaining Pact offensive operations
size of the Balkan Front and the questionable commit- against Greece and western Turkey. Romanian
ment of Romanian forces to the offensive, we believe reliability is thus a key to sustained Pact offen-
that the Balkan Front would probably confine its sive operations in the area.
actual wartime operations to engaging Greek forces in
the Thrace area and to defending the western flank of 125. Nevertheless, Pact land operations in these
the Maritime Front's forces attacking the Turkish areas, if successful, would offer potential benefits.
Straits. Seizure of the Straits would give the Pact flexibility in
committing units from the Black Sea Fleet and pro-
123. Against Eastern Turkey. While the Soviets vide a more secure line of communication for the
might launch a limited offensive into eastern Turkey, Mediterranean Squadron. A Pact advance into Austria
we have no evidence that they would undertake would threaten NATO forces in southern Germany
operations against Iran during an initial phase of the and northern Italy, while an offensive into eastern
war. During Soviet exercises, forces from the Trans- Turkey would tie down Turkish forces in the area.
caucasus Military District have formed a front
which-following Turkish and Iranian attacks-con-
ducted operations into eastern Turkey and Iran. In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea
these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126. as part of the
between the Turkish Black Sea coast and Lake Van in offensive by the Pact's Maritime Front, the Soviet
the direction of Ankara, and a Soviet army of four Black Sea Fleet would attempt to secure control of the
divisions moves into Iran. Other Soviet divisions, in- Black Sea, support the movement of Pact ground
eluding some from the North Caucasus Military Dis- forces along the western littoral, and assist in seizing
trict, form a reserve force-possibly under the control the Turkish Straits. Bulgarian and Romanian naval
of a North Caucasus Front. forces in the Black Sea would be primarily responsible
124. There are important constraints on initial Pact for coastal ASW and other forms of coastal and port
ground operations in the Southwestern TVD: defense, including the use of guns and missiles. Table
IV-6 shows Pact naval forces available for use in the
- The Pact probably would not be able to achieve Black Sea and Mediterranean.
general air superiority or cripple NATO's nucle-
ar war-fighting capability in the theater during 127. Initial Pact naval operations in the Black Sea
-conventional conflict. In the Balkans the Pact would be opposed primarily by Turkish forces, par-
lacks sufficient ground attack aircraft for simul- ticularly air units (possibly with some US augmenta-
taneous air attacks against aircraft carriers, tion) and a Turkish submarine force of some seven to
NATO airfields, and important air defense, nu- eight available diesel-powered submarines. The Greek
clear, and command and control targets. and Turkish Air Forces would oppose Pact surface
forces in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean
- The Pact would also face difficult terrain in most and Soviet naval and LRA aircraft overflying Turkish
of the Southwestern TVD which would impede territory or the Aegean Sea to conduct strikes in the
rapid force deployment and resupply and facili- Mediterranean.
tate NATO defense.
128. Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact's capability
to provide air and ASW defense for the amphibious
force designated to aid in seizing the Turkish Straits.
To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority
and to protect the amphibious force, the Soviets
- Soviet forces are at a considerable distance from probably would retain in the Black Sea at least some of
their wartime areas of operation. Prehostilities their available larger combatants equipped for ASW
deployment of forces would alert NA TO and and air defense-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins, and
permit defensive preparations, not only in this Krivaks. If none of these newer and more capable
secondary theater, but in Central Europe as well. Soviet units were available to support Pact naval
operations in support of the ground offensive, Pact
- Romanian forces, as well. as Romanian operation capabilities to defend these operations against NATO
and defense of lines of communication, would be might prove inadequate.
IV-27
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.