Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
the main part of Greece. However, considering the vital to sustaining Pact offensive operations size of the Balkan Front and the questionable commit- against Greece and western Turkey. Romanian ment of Romanian forces to the offensive, we believe reliability is thus a key to sustained Pact offen- that the Balkan Front would probably confine its sive operations in the area. actual wartime operations to engaging Greek forces in the Thrace area and to defending the western flank of 125. Nevertheless, Pact land operations in these the Maritime Front's forces attacking the Turkish areas, if successful, would offer potential benefits. Straits. Seizure of the Straits would give the Pact flexibility in committing units from the Black Sea Fleet and pro- 123. Against Eastern Turkey. While the Soviets vide a more secure line of communication for the might launch a limited offensive into eastern Turkey, Mediterranean Squadron. A Pact advance into Austria we have no evidence that they would undertake would threaten NATO forces in southern Germany operations against Iran during an initial phase of the and northern Italy, while an offensive into eastern war. During Soviet exercises, forces from the Trans- Turkey would tie down Turkish forces in the area. caucasus Military District have formed a front which-following Turkish and Iranian attacks-con- ducted operations into eastern Turkey and Iran. In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126. as part of the between the Turkish Black Sea coast and Lake Van in offensive by the Pact's Maritime Front, the Soviet the direction of Ankara, and a Soviet army of four Black Sea Fleet would attempt to secure control of the divisions moves into Iran. Other Soviet divisions, in- Black Sea, support the movement of Pact ground eluding some from the North Caucasus Military Dis- forces along the western littoral, and assist in seizing trict, form a reserve force-possibly under the control the Turkish Straits. Bulgarian and Romanian naval of a North Caucasus Front. forces in the Black Sea would be primarily responsible 124. There are important constraints on initial Pact for coastal ASW and other forms of coastal and port ground operations in the Southwestern TVD: defense, including the use of guns and missiles. Table IV-6 shows Pact naval forces available for use in the - The Pact probably would not be able to achieve Black Sea and Mediterranean. general air superiority or cripple NATO's nucle- ar war-fighting capability in the theater during 127. Initial Pact naval operations in the Black Sea -conventional conflict. In the Balkans the Pact would be opposed primarily by Turkish forces, par- lacks sufficient ground attack aircraft for simul- ticularly air units (possibly with some US augmenta- taneous air attacks against aircraft carriers, tion) and a Turkish submarine force of some seven to NATO airfields, and important air defense, nu- eight available diesel-powered submarines. The Greek clear, and command and control targets. and Turkish Air Forces would oppose Pact surface forces in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean - The Pact would also face difficult terrain in most and Soviet naval and LRA aircraft overflying Turkish of the Southwestern TVD which would impede territory or the Aegean Sea to conduct strikes in the rapid force deployment and resupply and facili- Mediterranean. tate NATO defense. 128. Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact's capability to provide air and ASW defense for the amphibious force designated to aid in seizing the Turkish Straits. To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force, the Soviets - Soviet forces are at a considerable distance from probably would retain in the Black Sea at least some of their wartime areas of operation. Prehostilities their available larger combatants equipped for ASW deployment of forces would alert NA TO and and air defense-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins, and permit defensive preparations, not only in this Krivaks. If none of these newer and more capable secondary theater, but in Central Europe as well. Soviet units were available to support Pact naval operations in support of the ground offensive, Pact - Romanian forces, as well. as Romanian operation capabilities to defend these operations against NATO and defense of lines of communication, would be might prove inadequate. IV-27 Top S.t
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.