Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

the main part of Greece. However, considering the vital to sustaining Pact offensive operations
size of the Balkan Front and the questionable commit- against Greece and western Turkey. Romanian
ment of Romanian forces to the offensive, we believe reliability is thus a key to sustained Pact offen-
that the Balkan Front would probably confine its sive operations in the area.
actual wartime operations to engaging Greek forces in
the Thrace area and to defending the western flank of 125. Nevertheless, Pact land operations in these
the Maritime Front's forces attacking the Turkish areas, if successful, would offer potential benefits.
Straits. Seizure of the Straits would give the Pact flexibility in
committing units from the Black Sea Fleet and pro-
123. Against Eastern Turkey. While the Soviets vide a more secure line of communication for the
might launch a limited offensive into eastern Turkey, Mediterranean Squadron. A Pact advance into Austria
we have no evidence that they would undertake would threaten NATO forces in southern Germany
operations against Iran during an initial phase of the and northern Italy, while an offensive into eastern
war. During Soviet exercises, forces from the Trans- Turkey would tie down Turkish forces in the area.
caucasus Military District have formed a front
which-following Turkish and Iranian attacks-con-
ducted operations into eastern Turkey and Iran. In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea
these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126. as part of the
between the Turkish Black Sea coast and Lake Van in offensive by the Pact's Maritime Front, the Soviet
the direction of Ankara, and a Soviet army of four Black Sea Fleet would attempt to secure control of the
divisions moves into Iran. Other Soviet divisions, in- Black Sea, support the movement of Pact ground
eluding some from the North Caucasus Military Dis- forces along the western littoral, and assist in seizing
trict, form a reserve force-possibly under the control the Turkish Straits. Bulgarian and Romanian naval
of a North Caucasus Front. forces in the Black Sea would be primarily responsible
124. There are important constraints on initial Pact for coastal ASW and other forms of coastal and port
ground operations in the Southwestern TVD: defense, including the use of guns and missiles. Table
IV-6 shows Pact naval forces available for use in the
- The Pact probably would not be able to achieve Black Sea and Mediterranean.
general air superiority or cripple NATO's nucle-
ar war-fighting capability in the theater during 127. Initial Pact naval operations in the Black Sea
-conventional conflict. In the Balkans the Pact would be opposed primarily by Turkish forces, par-
lacks sufficient ground attack aircraft for simul- ticularly air units (possibly with some US augmenta-
taneous air attacks against aircraft carriers, tion) and a Turkish submarine force of some seven to
NATO airfields, and important air defense, nu- eight available diesel-powered submarines. The Greek
clear, and command and control targets. and Turkish Air Forces would oppose Pact surface
forces in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean
- The Pact would also face difficult terrain in most and Soviet naval and LRA aircraft overflying Turkish
of the Southwestern TVD which would impede territory or the Aegean Sea to conduct strikes in the
rapid force deployment and resupply and facili- Mediterranean.
tate NATO defense.
128. Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact's capability
to provide air and ASW defense for the amphibious
force designated to aid in seizing the Turkish Straits.
To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority
and to protect the amphibious force, the Soviets
- Soviet forces are at a considerable distance from probably would retain in the Black Sea at least some of
their wartime areas of operation. Prehostilities their available larger combatants equipped for ASW
deployment of forces would alert NA TO and and air defense-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins, and
permit defensive preparations, not only in this Krivaks. If none of these newer and more capable
secondary theater, but in Central Europe as well. Soviet units were available to support Pact naval
operations in support of the ground offensive, Pact
- Romanian forces, as well. as Romanian operation capabilities to defend these operations against NATO
and defense of lines of communication, would be might prove inadequate.
IV-27
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