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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
the main part of Greece. However, considering the vital to sustaining Pact offensive operations
size of the Balkan Front and the questionable commit- against Greece and western Turkey. Romanian
ment of Romanian forces to the offensive, we believe reliability is thus a key to sustained Pact offen-
that the Balkan Front would probably confine its sive operations in the area.
actual wartime operations to engaging Greek forces in
the Thrace area and to defending the western flank of 125. Nevertheless, Pact land operations in these
the Maritime Front's forces attacking the Turkish areas, if successful, would offer potential benefits.
Straits. Seizure of the Straits would give the Pact flexibility in
committing units from the Black Sea Fleet and pro-
123. Against Eastern Turkey. While the Soviets vide a more secure line of communication for the
might launch a limited offensive into eastern Turkey, Mediterranean Squadron. A Pact advance into Austria
we have no evidence that they would undertake would threaten NATO forces in southern Germany
operations against Iran during an initial phase of the and northern Italy, while an offensive into eastern
war. During Soviet exercises, forces from the Trans- Turkey would tie down Turkish forces in the area.
caucasus Military District have formed a front
which-following Turkish and Iranian attacks-con-
ducted operations into eastern Turkey and Iran. In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea
these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126. as part of the
between the Turkish Black Sea coast and Lake Van in offensive by the Pact's Maritime Front, the Soviet
the direction of Ankara, and a Soviet army of four Black Sea Fleet would attempt to secure control of the
divisions moves into Iran. Other Soviet divisions, in- Black Sea, support the movement of Pact ground
eluding some from the North Caucasus Military Dis- forces along the western littoral, and assist in seizing
trict, form a reserve force-possibly under the control the Turkish Straits. Bulgarian and Romanian naval
of a North Caucasus Front. forces in the Black Sea would be primarily responsible
124. There are important constraints on initial Pact for coastal ASW and other forms of coastal and port
ground operations in the Southwestern TVD: defense, including the use of guns and missiles. Table
IV-6 shows Pact naval forces available for use in the
- The Pact probably would not be able to achieve Black Sea and Mediterranean.
general air superiority or cripple NATO's nucle-
ar war-fighting capability in the theater during 127. Initial Pact naval operations in the Black Sea
-conventional conflict. In the Balkans the Pact would be opposed primarily by Turkish forces, par-
lacks sufficient ground attack aircraft for simul- ticularly air units (possibly with some US augmenta-
taneous air attacks against aircraft carriers, tion) and a Turkish submarine force of some seven to
NATO airfields, and important air defense, nu- eight available diesel-powered submarines. The Greek
clear, and command and control targets. and Turkish Air Forces would oppose Pact surface
forces in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean
- The Pact would also face difficult terrain in most and Soviet naval and LRA aircraft overflying Turkish
of the Southwestern TVD which would impede territory or the Aegean Sea to conduct strikes in the
rapid force deployment and resupply and facili- Mediterranean.
tate NATO defense.
128. Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact's capability
to provide air and ASW defense for the amphibious
force designated to aid in seizing the Turkish Straits.
To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority
and to protect the amphibious force, the Soviets
- Soviet forces are at a considerable distance from probably would retain in the Black Sea at least some of
their wartime areas of operation. Prehostilities their available larger combatants equipped for ASW
deployment of forces would alert NA TO and and air defense-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins, and
permit defensive preparations, not only in this Krivaks. If none of these newer and more capable
secondary theater, but in Central Europe as well. Soviet units were available to support Pact naval
operations in support of the ground offensive, Pact
- Romanian forces, as well. as Romanian operation capabilities to defend these operations against NATO
and defense of lines of communication, would be might prove inadequate.
IV-27
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.