Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
Illustrative Warsaw Pact Operations in the Southwestern.TVD Figure IV-5 Northl~ l"l~ SWEDEN + ..- \i : . f+I- i ervef Da& . OLAND d s o s r 10 dWESsior Odss_M 4 'ic~.c- r r GEMAY1, 7y.YUOLAI -- ' fFoiP -- _'~a '--" 'T;p' r'". -. '4 upsuv rn Kie rnscaucasus se - Amphibious \.~ Fot~ assaults\ \ 4 6d t ( s ac e swim'-'N .I 4 3 bg Ndes ase cu 0 300kEllometers - . syR"- 544280)~ 577640 1.79 cIA District. Once these forces were mobilized, we area without timely linkup with the Maritime estimate that they would require about a week to Front. Airborne operations in this theater would be in position to launch an attack from Bulgaria. also have to compete for lift resources with If they were to move before the start of a war, operations planned in the Western TVD and thus this movement would provide warning to NATO have to await the accomplishment of these in the Southwestern Theater and elsewhere as operations. well. - 122. Against Greece. On the western flank of the - The ground campaign to seize the Straits woul Maritime Front, the remaining two Bulgarian armies, he dlifficult and time consumning and would consisting of four to six motorized rifle divisions and provide NATO time to obstruct the Straits and three tank brigades, would essentially form the Balkan S y t a rFront. This front could also include some Romanian The Soviets probably would consider that the forces, although it is more likely that the Romanians airborne division and naval infantry regiment would constitute their own national front in the TVD's which would be available for joint amphibious second echelon. the mission of the and airborne assaults would not be large enough Balkan Front is to break through Greek fortifications to overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.