“US Navy”42 pages
- p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO
or…
- p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely
excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
- p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
- p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise…
- p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets
might choose to attack with…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the
fully equipped…
- p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
- p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
- p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out
Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
- p. 84 …The
Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
- p. 85 …NATO
placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
- p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than
probably commit few bombers…
- p. 88 …As of 1975, however,
weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
- p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded
as only a partial solution to the…
- p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets
in NATO Europe, and the 150…
- p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
- p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the…
- p. 113 …Aboard
ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection
249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
- p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the
option of using merchant communications circuits for
command and control…
- p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
- p. 122 …Some common computer programs are
being used for logistics and battle management sup-
13. In wartime…
- p. 145 Top
Table IV-4
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
- p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing
Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
- p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than
were canceled…
- p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th
sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
- p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
- p. 154 …Many have
air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
- p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
- p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact,
however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
- p. 159 …They probably
Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept
Cruisers ... 1
Missile…
- p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise
missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
- p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft
missiles, thereby reducing the…
- p. 168 …the Soviets
would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close
proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
- p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
- p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit
could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
- p. 179 …Soviet Navy
inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
- p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM
mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
- p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in
Soviets clearly regard the US…
- p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
- p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of
Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
- p. 200 …T s copy
is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
KEY JUDGMENTS
Warsaw Pact Policy and Doctrine for Theater Warfare
1. It is Soviet policy to acquire and maintain forces capable of
successfully fighting either a conventional or nuclear war in Europe and
to keep a clear numerical advantage over NATO in important military
assets. Soviet leaders stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be
in place at the outset of hostilities. They intend any future European
conflict to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory. (1, 1-2)
2. The Soviet Union views control of its East European allies as vital
to its national interests. The East European members of the Pact
provide sizable forces and a territorial buffer between NATO and the
Soviet Union. (See figure 1.) The presence or proximity of large,
well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets considerable leverage in
exerting control over these countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of
the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets also value their military strength as a
means of influencing European domestic and foreign policy decisions
and deterring political or military developments which might alter the
balance of power to their disadvantage. They do not, however, measure
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the larger, global
balance and, accordingly, are inclined to be very cautious in the use of
military force in Europe. (1, 2-3)
3. Our analysis of Soviet nuclear policy and doctrine has led us to
the following judgments:
-- The Soviets believe that the initial stages of a conflict probably
would be conventional, and they would prefer that a NATO-
Pact conflict remain nonnuclear, but they expect that it would
eventually involve the use of nuclear weapons. (1, 1.0)
-There is evidence that the Soviets now have a more flexible
policy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but they
apparently have not sought to match NATO's capacity for
accurate and selective use of very low yield nuclear weapons,
and they remain profoundly skeptical of the possiblity of
controlling escalation. (I, 12)
- We cannot predict how the Soviets would respond to a limited
and selective NATO use of nuclear weapons or the conditions
under which the Soviets might initiate nuclear operations in a
NA'TO-Pact war. (1, 13-14)
References are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs (Arabic numbers) in this volume of the
Estimate.
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