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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 114 …recently halted Soviet air operations from Conakry. These developments will obviously force the 257. Many officers…
  • p. 115 …order to keep other in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational. of communication…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets could elect to provide combat forces scale commitment of manpower and materiel which to…
  • p. 187 …This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to…
  • p. 188 …a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few recently introduced Flogger…
KEY JUDGMENTS
Warsaw Pact Policy and Doctrine for Theater Warfare
1. It is Soviet policy to acquire and maintain forces capable of
successfully fighting either a conventional or nuclear war in Europe and
to keep a clear numerical advantage over NATO in important military
assets. Soviet leaders stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be
in place at the outset of hostilities. They intend any future European
conflict to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory. (1, 1-2)
2. The Soviet Union views control of its East European allies as vital
to its national interests. The East European members of the Pact
provide sizable forces and a territorial buffer between NATO and the
Soviet Union. (See figure 1.) The presence or proximity of large,
well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets considerable leverage in
exerting control over these countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of
the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets also value their military strength as a
means of influencing European domestic and foreign policy decisions
and deterring political or military developments which might alter the
balance of power to their disadvantage. They do not, however, measure
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the larger, global
balance and, accordingly, are inclined to be very cautious in the use of
military force in Europe. (1, 2-3)
3. Our analysis of Soviet nuclear policy and doctrine has led us to
the following judgments:
-- The Soviets believe that the initial stages of a conflict probably
would be conventional, and they would prefer that a NATO-
Pact conflict remain nonnuclear, but they expect that it would
eventually involve the use of nuclear weapons. (1, 1.0)
-There is evidence that the Soviets now have a more flexible
policy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but they
apparently have not sought to match NATO's capacity for
accurate and selective use of very low yield nuclear weapons,
and they remain profoundly skeptical of the possiblity of
controlling escalation. (I, 12)
- We cannot predict how the Soviets would respond to a limited
and selective NATO use of nuclear weapons or the conditions
under which the Soviets might initiate nuclear operations in a
NA'TO-Pact war. (1, 13-14)
References are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs (Arabic numbers) in this volume of the
Estimate.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.