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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Top ecre
Initial Ground Operations front would move into Austria to protect the flank of
116. the Pact has the Western TVD and to destroy any NATO forces
11._________________________ tePcths thatmgthv nee utintrioy In exer-
contingency plans for offensive operations in the south thatmight have enter edAustrian territory.in er
directed against Austria, possibly northern Italy, the cises, this invasion is preceded hy either a West
Bosporus, the Dardanelles Greece, eastern TurkeI. German or an Italian incursion into Austria. In any
and possibly Iran. case, we believe that the Pact would invade Austria at
onceivably the Pact the start of a war to secure the southern flank of the
_________________________~oceiaby te Pct Western TVD).
might attempt to advance through Yugoslavia to at-
tack northern Italy. The success of such a move would 118 the Pact expects it
depend primarily on the attitude and political position would take about two weeks to defeat the main bodies
of the Yugoslav Government. If the government au- of Austrian and NATO forces in Austria and be in a
thorized the transit of Pact forces through Yugoslav position to advance into northern Italy. Given this
territory, the Pact would have shorter and quicker timing, we believe that the Pact sees an invasion of
access to northern Italy. If Yugoslavia remained neu. Italy primarily as a possible followup operation and
tral, any Pact incursion probably would prompt armed not essential to the success of the initial campaign
resistance and defense of the homeland by the Yugo- against NATO. Moreover, an early move toward Italy
slav armed forces, which could seriously detract from could present a difficult problem for Pact command-
the Pact's main efforts in Central Europe. On balance, ers in that the main objective of the Danube Front, at
we judge it unlikely that Yugoslavia would grant the least during the first week of the war, would be to
Pact permission to use its territory or that the Pact protect the flank of the Western TVD.
would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.
attack northern Italy. This judgment is qualified, Before initiating an assault against the Straits, the
however, by our uncertainty concerning future politi- Soviets plan to move ground and air forces from the
cal attitudes and developments in Yugoslavia in the Odessa Military District into Bulgaria, with most of
post-Tito era. these forces transiting Romania. These forces, prob-
117. Against Austria and Italy. In wartime, the ably augmented by NSWP forces, would form the
four Soviet divisions in the Southern Group of Forces Maritime (or Odessa) Front; consisting of as many as
(SGF) and the six divisions of the Hungarian Army 12 divisions. This front's objectives would be to destroy
would be subordinate to the Danube Front. (See table Turkish forces in eastern Thrace, to break through the
IV-5 and figure IV-5.) this fortifications protecting the land approaches to the
Turkish Straits, and to seize the Straits. Exercises
Table IV-5 indicate that Soviet forces in the Kiev Military District
also have contingency roles as second-echelon forces in
Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions and this or other areas of the Southwestern TVD.
Brigrades Available for Use in the Southwestern
Theater of Military Operations 120. Amphibious and airborne operations, using
January 1979 primarily Soviet forces-probably one motorized rifle
n the Baka- regiment and one naval infantry regiment-and ainSthe BalkothItee Bulgarian naval infantry battalion, would probably be--- Sothwestern
Soviet NSWP USSRb Total conducted to support a forced crossing of the Bosporus
by elements of the Maritime Front. The Pact wouldDivisions
Tank 2 3 8 13 coordinate the timing and location of amphibious
Motorized landings with both airborne operations and the move-
Rifle 2 19 27 48 ment of the Maritime Front along the southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary (Southern Group of Forces) and would almost certainly be used to establish sea lines of
ground forces in the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian Armies. communication to augment the relatively poor land-
"Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Odessa, Kiev, lines supporting the Maritime Front.North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts. The Soviets
also have two airborne divisions in these military districts which 121. Timing the seizure of the Straits would present
could be used against NATO in one or more theaters. Pact planners with the following special problems:Two of these brigades are designated for wartime expansion to
motorized rifle divisions. - Operations to seize the Straits would require
SE'ClET Soviet ground forces from the Odessa Military
IV-25
~iTo e

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.