Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
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Top ecre Initial Ground Operations front would move into Austria to protect the flank of 116. the Pact has the Western TVD and to destroy any NATO forces 11._________________________ tePcths thatmgthv nee utintrioy In exer- contingency plans for offensive operations in the south thatmight have enter edAustrian territory.in er directed against Austria, possibly northern Italy, the cises, this invasion is preceded hy either a West Bosporus, the Dardanelles Greece, eastern TurkeI. German or an Italian incursion into Austria. In any and possibly Iran. case, we believe that the Pact would invade Austria at onceivably the Pact the start of a war to secure the southern flank of the _________________________~oceiaby te Pct Western TVD). might attempt to advance through Yugoslavia to at- tack northern Italy. The success of such a move would 118 the Pact expects it depend primarily on the attitude and political position would take about two weeks to defeat the main bodies of the Yugoslav Government. If the government au- of Austrian and NATO forces in Austria and be in a thorized the transit of Pact forces through Yugoslav position to advance into northern Italy. Given this territory, the Pact would have shorter and quicker timing, we believe that the Pact sees an invasion of access to northern Italy. If Yugoslavia remained neu. Italy primarily as a possible followup operation and tral, any Pact incursion probably would prompt armed not essential to the success of the initial campaign resistance and defense of the homeland by the Yugo- against NATO. Moreover, an early move toward Italy slav armed forces, which could seriously detract from could present a difficult problem for Pact command- the Pact's main efforts in Central Europe. On balance, ers in that the main objective of the Danube Front, at we judge it unlikely that Yugoslavia would grant the least during the first week of the war, would be to Pact permission to use its territory or that the Pact protect the flank of the Western TVD. would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack northern Italy. This judgment is qualified, Before initiating an assault against the Straits, the however, by our uncertainty concerning future politi- Soviets plan to move ground and air forces from the cal attitudes and developments in Yugoslavia in the Odessa Military District into Bulgaria, with most of post-Tito era. these forces transiting Romania. These forces, prob- 117. Against Austria and Italy. In wartime, the ably augmented by NSWP forces, would form the four Soviet divisions in the Southern Group of Forces Maritime (or Odessa) Front; consisting of as many as (SGF) and the six divisions of the Hungarian Army 12 divisions. This front's objectives would be to destroy would be subordinate to the Danube Front. (See table Turkish forces in eastern Thrace, to break through the IV-5 and figure IV-5.) this fortifications protecting the land approaches to the Turkish Straits, and to seize the Straits. Exercises Table IV-5 indicate that Soviet forces in the Kiev Military District also have contingency roles as second-echelon forces in Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions and this or other areas of the Southwestern TVD. Brigrades Available for Use in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations 120. Amphibious and airborne operations, using January 1979 primarily Soviet forces-probably one motorized rifle n the Baka- regiment and one naval infantry regiment-and ainSthe BalkothItee Bulgarian naval infantry battalion, would probably be--- Sothwestern Soviet NSWP USSRb Total conducted to support a forced crossing of the Bosporus by elements of the Maritime Front. The Pact wouldDivisions Tank 2 3 8 13 coordinate the timing and location of amphibious Motorized landings with both airborne operations and the move- Rifle 2 19 27 48 ment of the Maritime Front along the southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary (Southern Group of Forces) and would almost certainly be used to establish sea lines of ground forces in the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian Armies. communication to augment the relatively poor land- "Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Odessa, Kiev, lines supporting the Maritime Front.North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts. The Soviets also have two airborne divisions in these military districts which 121. Timing the seizure of the Straits would present could be used against NATO in one or more theaters. Pact planners with the following special problems:Two of these brigades are designated for wartime expansion to motorized rifle divisions. - Operations to seize the Straits would require SE'ClET Soviet ground forces from the Odessa Military IV-25 ~iTo e
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.