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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
Top ecre
Initial Ground Operations front would move into Austria to protect the flank of
116. the Pact has the Western TVD and to destroy any NATO forces
11._________________________ tePcths thatmgthv nee utintrioy In exer-
contingency plans for offensive operations in the south thatmight have enter edAustrian territory.in er
directed against Austria, possibly northern Italy, the cises, this invasion is preceded hy either a West
Bosporus, the Dardanelles Greece, eastern TurkeI. German or an Italian incursion into Austria. In any
and possibly Iran. case, we believe that the Pact would invade Austria at
onceivably the Pact the start of a war to secure the southern flank of the
_________________________~oceiaby te Pct Western TVD).
might attempt to advance through Yugoslavia to at-
tack northern Italy. The success of such a move would 118 the Pact expects it
depend primarily on the attitude and political position would take about two weeks to defeat the main bodies
of the Yugoslav Government. If the government au- of Austrian and NATO forces in Austria and be in a
thorized the transit of Pact forces through Yugoslav position to advance into northern Italy. Given this
territory, the Pact would have shorter and quicker timing, we believe that the Pact sees an invasion of
access to northern Italy. If Yugoslavia remained neu. Italy primarily as a possible followup operation and
tral, any Pact incursion probably would prompt armed not essential to the success of the initial campaign
resistance and defense of the homeland by the Yugo- against NATO. Moreover, an early move toward Italy
slav armed forces, which could seriously detract from could present a difficult problem for Pact command-
the Pact's main efforts in Central Europe. On balance, ers in that the main objective of the Danube Front, at
we judge it unlikely that Yugoslavia would grant the least during the first week of the war, would be to
Pact permission to use its territory or that the Pact protect the flank of the Western TVD.
would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.
attack northern Italy. This judgment is qualified, Before initiating an assault against the Straits, the
however, by our uncertainty concerning future politi- Soviets plan to move ground and air forces from the
cal attitudes and developments in Yugoslavia in the Odessa Military District into Bulgaria, with most of
post-Tito era. these forces transiting Romania. These forces, prob-
117. Against Austria and Italy. In wartime, the ably augmented by NSWP forces, would form the
four Soviet divisions in the Southern Group of Forces Maritime (or Odessa) Front; consisting of as many as
(SGF) and the six divisions of the Hungarian Army 12 divisions. This front's objectives would be to destroy
would be subordinate to the Danube Front. (See table Turkish forces in eastern Thrace, to break through the
IV-5 and figure IV-5.) this fortifications protecting the land approaches to the
Turkish Straits, and to seize the Straits. Exercises
Table IV-5 indicate that Soviet forces in the Kiev Military District
also have contingency roles as second-echelon forces in
Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions and this or other areas of the Southwestern TVD.
Brigrades Available for Use in the Southwestern
Theater of Military Operations 120. Amphibious and airborne operations, using
January 1979 primarily Soviet forces-probably one motorized rifle
n the Baka- regiment and one naval infantry regiment-and ainSthe BalkothItee Bulgarian naval infantry battalion, would probably be--- Sothwestern
Soviet NSWP USSRb Total conducted to support a forced crossing of the Bosporus
by elements of the Maritime Front. The Pact wouldDivisions
Tank 2 3 8 13 coordinate the timing and location of amphibious
Motorized landings with both airborne operations and the move-
Rifle 2 19 27 48 ment of the Maritime Front along the southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary (Southern Group of Forces) and would almost certainly be used to establish sea lines of
ground forces in the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian Armies. communication to augment the relatively poor land-
"Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Odessa, Kiev, lines supporting the Maritime Front.North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts. The Soviets
also have two airborne divisions in these military districts which 121. Timing the seizure of the Straits would present
could be used against NATO in one or more theaters. Pact planners with the following special problems:Two of these brigades are designated for wartime expansion to
motorized rifle divisions. - Operations to seize the Straits would require
SE'ClET Soviet ground forces from the Odessa Military
IV-25
~iTo e

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.