Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
109. Summary Assessment. According to one view B. The Initial Campaign in the Southwestern in the Intelligence Community, the allocation of most Theater of Military Operations Pact tactical and LRA bomber aircraft to a large-scale Air Operation in West Germany and the Benelux 112. the Soviets are countries would severely reduce the probability of the concerned aboutthte sizable groupings of NATO forces Pact's achieving air superiority over the Baltic in the in the south and especially the threat of air and initial stage of a war with NATO' Without air nuclear strikes which they expect would be launched superiority the Pact would have a low probability of against Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully defending Fleet during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Accordingly, the amphibious force against NATO missile-armed the Soviets assign high priority to the destruction of fast patrol boats. It is further believed that Pact ASW Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and air- forces probably would be unable to prevent NATO craft carriers in the Mediterranean early in a war. submarine attacks against the amphibious forces. They also place great importance on capturing the These conclusions are based on the judgments con- Turkish Straits-the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. tained in paragraphs 88-94, above. 110. An alternative view holds that the Warsaw 113. The Pact views early seizure of the Turkish Pact's achievement of air superiority over the Baltic Straits as crucial to the success of its maritime strategy would depend on many factors, including the alloca- in the Southwestern TVD for the following reasons: tion of Pact naval aviation aircraft to suppression of NATO air capabilities in the Baltic area, the degree of - It would be necessary for wartime augmentation success the Pact forces might achieve in these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with which they achieved permit the return of ships to the Black Sea fr it. The holders of this view believe that the conclu- repairs and resupply. sions expressed above would be highly sensitive to a number of additional factors, including assumptions - It would deny entry into the Black Sea of about the interaction of NATO and Pact surface and additional NATO ships and submarines. subsurface forces as well as about the timing and urgency which the Pact attached to prosecution of the - It would deny NATO use of the Straits area for amphibious operations. They observe that analysis of launching any attacks against the USSR or Pact all these factors has not been sufficient to support any forces in the Black Sea, and permit Pact use of conclusions, explicit or implied, as to the probability of the area to support attacks into the Medi- success or failure of Pact amphibious operations, or the terranean. degree to which the Pact could defeat NATO subma- rine operations, in the Baltic. 114. Soviet stress the strategic importance of Austria as a ink between the Western I1. A third view holds that the achievement of air and the Southwestern TVDs and cite the importance superiority is but one of a number of key factors of being prepared to counter any NATO threat which, taken together, will determine the outcome of launched across Austrian territory. There is also evi- the Pact's Baltic campaign." The holder of this view dence that the Pact has plans for a major attack on considers that allocation of considerable air assets to northern Italy and deep offensives -into Greece and the Pact's Baltic campaign is likely but believes that Turkey. other factors of equally critical importance include the extent of Pact success in countering NATO mining and 115. in the Southwestern submarine operations in the approaches to the Danish TVD have | Ithe Pact launching multifront Straits. offensives in response to NATO attacks against all ? The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; these objectives simultaneously with the Central Euro- the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of pean campaign. We believe that to achieve its more State; and the Director, National Security Agency. important objectives, however, the Pact would confine The holders of this vlew are the Director, Defense Intelligence its initial ground operations to the Straits area, Austria, Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department and possibly eastern Turkey. In addition, at the onset of the Air Force. of a war, air and naval attacks would almost certainly ' The holder of this view is the Director of Naval Intelligence, be mounted against NATO forces in these areas and in Department of the Navy the Mediterranean. IV-24 Top a't
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.