Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

109. Summary Assessment. According to one view B. The Initial Campaign in the Southwestern
in the Intelligence Community, the allocation of most Theater of Military Operations
Pact tactical and LRA bomber aircraft to a large-scale
Air Operation in West Germany and the Benelux 112. the Soviets are
countries would severely reduce the probability of the concerned aboutthte sizable groupings of NATO forces
Pact's achieving air superiority over the Baltic in the in the south and especially the threat of air and
initial stage of a war with NATO' Without air nuclear strikes which they expect would be launched
superiority the Pact would have a low probability of against Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th
sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully defending Fleet during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Accordingly,
the amphibious force against NATO missile-armed the Soviets assign high priority to the destruction of
fast patrol boats. It is further believed that Pact ASW Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and air-
forces probably would be unable to prevent NATO craft carriers in the Mediterranean early in a war.
submarine attacks against the amphibious forces. They also place great importance on capturing the
These conclusions are based on the judgments con- Turkish Straits-the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.
tained in paragraphs 88-94, above.
110. An alternative view holds that the Warsaw 113. The Pact views early seizure of the Turkish
Pact's achievement of air superiority over the Baltic Straits as crucial to the success of its maritime strategy
would depend on many factors, including the alloca- in the Southwestern TVD for the following reasons:
tion of Pact naval aviation aircraft to suppression of
NATO air capabilities in the Baltic area, the degree of - It would be necessary for wartime augmentation
success the Pact forces might achieve in these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with which they achieved permit the return of ships to the Black Sea fr
it. The holders of this view believe that the conclu- repairs and resupply.
sions expressed above would be highly sensitive to a
number of additional factors, including assumptions - It would deny entry into the Black Sea of
about the interaction of NATO and Pact surface and additional NATO ships and submarines.
subsurface forces as well as about the timing and
urgency which the Pact attached to prosecution of the - It would deny NATO use of the Straits area for
amphibious operations. They observe that analysis of launching any attacks against the USSR or Pact
all these factors has not been sufficient to support any forces in the Black Sea, and permit Pact use of
conclusions, explicit or implied, as to the probability of the area to support attacks into the Medi-
success or failure of Pact amphibious operations, or the terranean.
degree to which the Pact could defeat NATO subma-
rine operations, in the Baltic. 114. Soviet stress the strategic
importance of Austria as a ink between the Western
I1. A third view holds that the achievement of air and the Southwestern TVDs and cite the importance
superiority is but one of a number of key factors of being prepared to counter any NATO threat
which, taken together, will determine the outcome of launched across Austrian territory. There is also evi-
the Pact's Baltic campaign." The holder of this view dence that the Pact has plans for a major attack on
considers that allocation of considerable air assets to northern Italy and deep offensives -into Greece and
the Pact's Baltic campaign is likely but believes that Turkey.
other factors of equally critical importance include the
extent of Pact success in countering NATO mining and 115. in the Southwestern
submarine operations in the approaches to the Danish TVD have | Ithe Pact launching multifront
Straits. offensives in response to NATO attacks against all
? The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; these objectives simultaneously with the Central Euro-
the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of pean campaign. We believe that to achieve its more
State; and the Director, National Security Agency. important objectives, however, the Pact would confine
The holders of this vlew are the Director, Defense Intelligence its initial ground operations to the Straits area, Austria,
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department and possibly eastern Turkey. In addition, at the onset
of the Air Force. of a war, air and naval attacks would almost certainly
' The holder of this view is the Director of Naval Intelligence, be mounted against NATO forces in these areas and in
Department of the Navy the Mediterranean.
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