Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
the area west of Bornholm Island. Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the operation would require the multi- affected by the demands of competing tasks and by
national integration of a variety of forces, including Pact success in gaining sea control and air superiority
tactical aircraft and mine-warfare, ASW, gunfire sup- during the initial phase of operations. In the event of
port, and logistic ships. This continues to be a problem continued antiship operations by NATO submarines
for the Pact in its combined Baltic Sea amphibious and fast patrol boats, both of which could also be used
exercises. to lay mines, the Pact might feel it necessary to
101. We conclude that failure to attain air superior- allocate a significant portion of the smaller ships to the
ity and sea control of the western Baltic, especially in protection of the Baltic Sea supply lines. They also
conventional war, would almost certainly cause the could route convoys to take advantage of coastal
Pact to reconsider the feasibility of its planned defense coverage. Pact planners seem to feel it neces-
amphibious operations. If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than
were canceled, Pact planners would also have to would Western navies.
decide if any airborne operations could be conducted 106. Operations in the North Sea. In addition to
independently. the initial naval operations in the Baltic itself, other
102. Mine Warfare. Pact planners believe that a operations would be conducted in the North Sea to
key clement in all Baltic operations would be to thwart destroy important NATO maritime targets, especially
NATO minelaying operations by destroying mine aircraft carrier or amphibious forces, to prevent
stockpiles and minelaying ships before they deploy. NATO naval reinforcements from entering the Baltic
Both Denmark and West Germany possess large stocks and to sever the lines of communication through the
of mines (approximately 10,000 for the Germans and North Sea to the European continent.
6,000 for the Danes), and more could be introduced
into the area by other NATO members. Soviet doc- 107. Evidence indicates that anti-surface-ship air
trine and probably Pact planning emphasize the need operations in the North Sea and its approaches would
to locate NATO mine stockpiles in peacetime so that, be conducted primarily by missile-equipped . aircraft
in the event NATO did not deploy them before the of the Baltic Fleet and possibly some from the North-
outbreak of hostilities, the mines could be destroyed ern Fleet. Pact planners envision that operations from
early in the war. Baltic airfields probably would require the establish-
ment of safe flight corridors-probably using some of
103. We have reliable evidence that Pact planners these same missile-equipped aircraft-across Denmark
would consider NATO minefields off the Danish and or northern West Germany. They also probably be-
German coasts to be a serious threat to their amphib- lieve that airstrikes by way of the Norwegian Sea
ions operations. The task of clearing paths through would require suppression of Norwegian- and UK-
large fields of contact and influence mines, particularly based air defenses. If the Pact's initial air defense
if opposed by NATO air and naval forces, would be suppression operations were successful, those surviving
viewed by the Pact as extremely difficult and poten- strike aircraft not on nuclear alert would then be
tially quite costly. In addition, Pact mine-clearing available to attack NATO forces in the North Sea.
forces have not demonstrated a high level of proficiency Initially, in a period of conventional warfare, as much
in exercises or other peacetime operations such as in as one-third of the Baltic and Northern fleet naval
the Gulf of Suez. aircraft probably would be withheld for nuclear
104. Nonetheless, Pact naval forces in the Baltic operations.
have approximately 175 mine warfare ships and craft
of all types and routinely train in mine-clearing 108. the Soviets
operations. In addition, the use of air-cushion vehicles intend to deploy a tew Ba tic andNorthTern Fleet
(the Soviets have 15 to 20 in the Baltic) could reduce submarines to the North Sea before the outbreak of
to a limited extent the vulnerability of some light hostilities to complement the antiship operations of
amphibious elements to NATO mines. Pact aircraft. A deployment from the Baltic, however,
would provide warning indications to NATO. We
105. The Soviets consider that sea transportation is believe that deployments of surface ships into the
important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to hostilities would be unlikely be-
along a coastal axis and that, under some conditions, it cause the Pact would lack air cover there early in a
may be the principal means of resupply. The number war.
IV-23

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.