Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
the area west of Bornholm Island. Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the operation would require the multi- affected by the demands of competing tasks and by national integration of a variety of forces, including Pact success in gaining sea control and air superiority tactical aircraft and mine-warfare, ASW, gunfire sup- during the initial phase of operations. In the event of port, and logistic ships. This continues to be a problem continued antiship operations by NATO submarines for the Pact in its combined Baltic Sea amphibious and fast patrol boats, both of which could also be used exercises. to lay mines, the Pact might feel it necessary to 101. We conclude that failure to attain air superior- allocate a significant portion of the smaller ships to the ity and sea control of the western Baltic, especially in protection of the Baltic Sea supply lines. They also conventional war, would almost certainly cause the could route convoys to take advantage of coastal Pact to reconsider the feasibility of its planned defense coverage. Pact planners seem to feel it neces- amphibious operations. If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled, Pact planners would also have to would Western navies. decide if any airborne operations could be conducted 106. Operations in the North Sea. In addition to independently. the initial naval operations in the Baltic itself, other 102. Mine Warfare. Pact planners believe that a operations would be conducted in the North Sea to key clement in all Baltic operations would be to thwart destroy important NATO maritime targets, especially NATO minelaying operations by destroying mine aircraft carrier or amphibious forces, to prevent stockpiles and minelaying ships before they deploy. NATO naval reinforcements from entering the Baltic Both Denmark and West Germany possess large stocks and to sever the lines of communication through the of mines (approximately 10,000 for the Germans and North Sea to the European continent. 6,000 for the Danes), and more could be introduced into the area by other NATO members. Soviet doc- 107. Evidence indicates that anti-surface-ship air trine and probably Pact planning emphasize the need operations in the North Sea and its approaches would to locate NATO mine stockpiles in peacetime so that, be conducted primarily by missile-equipped . aircraft in the event NATO did not deploy them before the of the Baltic Fleet and possibly some from the North- outbreak of hostilities, the mines could be destroyed ern Fleet. Pact planners envision that operations from early in the war. Baltic airfields probably would require the establish- ment of safe flight corridors-probably using some of 103. We have reliable evidence that Pact planners these same missile-equipped aircraft-across Denmark would consider NATO minefields off the Danish and or northern West Germany. They also probably be- German coasts to be a serious threat to their amphib- lieve that airstrikes by way of the Norwegian Sea ions operations. The task of clearing paths through would require suppression of Norwegian- and UK- large fields of contact and influence mines, particularly based air defenses. If the Pact's initial air defense if opposed by NATO air and naval forces, would be suppression operations were successful, those surviving viewed by the Pact as extremely difficult and poten- strike aircraft not on nuclear alert would then be tially quite costly. In addition, Pact mine-clearing available to attack NATO forces in the North Sea. forces have not demonstrated a high level of proficiency Initially, in a period of conventional warfare, as much in exercises or other peacetime operations such as in as one-third of the Baltic and Northern fleet naval the Gulf of Suez. aircraft probably would be withheld for nuclear 104. Nonetheless, Pact naval forces in the Baltic operations. have approximately 175 mine warfare ships and craft of all types and routinely train in mine-clearing 108. the Soviets operations. In addition, the use of air-cushion vehicles intend to deploy a tew Ba tic andNorthTern Fleet (the Soviets have 15 to 20 in the Baltic) could reduce submarines to the North Sea before the outbreak of to a limited extent the vulnerability of some light hostilities to complement the antiship operations of amphibious elements to NATO mines. Pact aircraft. A deployment from the Baltic, however, would provide warning indications to NATO. We 105. The Soviets consider that sea transportation is believe that deployments of surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to hostilities would be unlikely be- along a coastal axis and that, under some conditions, it cause the Pact would lack air cover there early in a may be the principal means of resupply. The number war. IV-23
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.