Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Top F systems were designed for self-defense and the protec- ized rifle division. A Polish mechanized division which tion of other ships in close company, however, and do has received some amphibious training and Soviet not have a wide-area defense capability. Pact air motorized rifle divisions from the USSR could be superiority in the Baltic would thus be enhanced only included in follow-on landings. The amphibious land- to the extent that these ships defended the airspace ings would be coordinated with the ground offensive overhead, forced NATO aircraft into inefficient attack in Jutland and with airborne landings by a Polish patterns, and possibly causel some attrition among the division and perhaps Soviet airborne troops. attacking formations. The Pact probably views the 60 97. The bverall direction of Baltic amphibious oper- F-104 fighter-bombers (armed with short-range anti- 9 tion o a pos ofer- ship cruise missiles) of the West German naval air arm ationis would be from the command post of theshi cris misils)ofhe es Gemannaal ir rm Western Theater of Military Operations (the TVD as constituting a primary threat to its surface forces in st ern Theate a tVD Oputiommane for the Baltic. staff would include a TVD deputy commander for naval forces). Front and fleet staffs would perform 93. Most major Soviet warships have some capabil- battle management functions. We also expect that the ity to control air defense aircraft in simple airborne front would deploy an operations group to control the intercepts. The Soviets occasionally practice such oper- amphibious operation ashore and that the front and ations in the Baltic, but most, if not all, air intercept fleet would exchange operations groups to facilitate operations in the area probably would be controlled coordination. Interservice coordination and control from land-based facilities. Moreover, shipborne con- probably would be the responsibility of the TVD trollers generally are not proficient. deputy commander for naval forces. 94. Soviet plans for coordinating the air defense 98. operations of the various forces in the Baltic to prevent = operations to wea en NATO de enses in the mutual interference are unclear. ve would amphibious landing area would be conducted by Pact expect a theater air defense comman er to coordinate tactical aircraft, including helicopters, and naval gun- the air defense operations throughout the Western fire. These operations might be augmented by naval TVD, bombers of the Baltic Fleet Air Force. The regiment of ack o SU-17 Fitter fighter-bombers of the Baltic Fleet Air training could lead to major failures in the air defense Force also could provide direct support of Pact system there. amphibious operations. This regiment might also at- 95. Amphibious Operations.| tack other land targets in the Baltic such as NATO we be ieve that if naval bases, ports, and air defense installations, and be initial sea control and air superiority operations were used for countering the large number of Danish and successful, Pact forces in the Baltic would then con- West German fast patrol boats. centrate on supporting the Polish (Northern) Front's 99. Because of a shortage of NSWP landing craft, offensive across northern West Germany and into some Polish and East German amphibious assault Jutland. Combined amphibious and airborne landings forces probably would use Soviet lift in the initial are planned against the Danish islands. The Soviets assault. East Germany's current production of amphib- consider seizure of these islands, especially Zealand, to ious ships, however, will soon provide sufficient lift for be necessary to prevent naval use of the Baltic by its specially trained motorized rifle regiment. Al- NATO, to permit passage of Soviet naval forces to and though the two remaining regiments of the East from the North Sea, and to be able to carry out German motorized rifle division are not trained for subsequent amphibious operations against southern amphibious operations, we have evidence that they Norway. Early airborne or amphibious operations are would be lifted by merchant ships as a followup force. also planned against Bornholm Island to neutralize Because of the relatively short distances between the NATO intelligence collection facilities there and pre- Danish islands and Pact territory, the shortage of vent its subsequent use by NATO combat forces. landing craft for rapid reinforcement and resupply of 96. Amphibious operations in the Baltic would in- the landing forces on the islands could be alleviated to volve ships from the Soviet, Polish, and East German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces craft, air-cushion vehicles, and possibly helicopters. would be drawn from the Soviet Baltic Fleet naval 100. The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing division, and Baltic amphibious operation would depend on the a specially trained regiment of an East German motor- attainment of air superiority and sea control of at least IV-22
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.