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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Top F
systems were designed for self-defense and the protec- ized rifle division. A Polish mechanized division which
tion of other ships in close company, however, and do has received some amphibious training and Soviet
not have a wide-area defense capability. Pact air motorized rifle divisions from the USSR could be
superiority in the Baltic would thus be enhanced only included in follow-on landings. The amphibious land-
to the extent that these ships defended the airspace ings would be coordinated with the ground offensive
overhead, forced NATO aircraft into inefficient attack in Jutland and with airborne landings by a Polish
patterns, and possibly causel some attrition among the division and perhaps Soviet airborne troops.
attacking formations. The Pact probably views the 60 97. The bverall direction of Baltic amphibious oper-
F-104 fighter-bombers (armed with short-range anti- 9 tion o a pos ofer-
ship cruise missiles) of the West German naval air arm ationis would be from the command post of theshi cris misils)ofhe es Gemannaal ir rm Western Theater of Military Operations (the TVD
as constituting a primary threat to its surface forces in st ern Theate a tVD Oputiommane for
the Baltic. staff would include a TVD deputy commander for
naval forces). Front and fleet staffs would perform
93. Most major Soviet warships have some capabil- battle management functions. We also expect that the
ity to control air defense aircraft in simple airborne front would deploy an operations group to control the
intercepts. The Soviets occasionally practice such oper- amphibious operation ashore and that the front and
ations in the Baltic, but most, if not all, air intercept fleet would exchange operations groups to facilitate
operations in the area probably would be controlled coordination. Interservice coordination and control
from land-based facilities. Moreover, shipborne con- probably would be the responsibility of the TVD
trollers generally are not proficient. deputy commander for naval forces.
94. Soviet plans for coordinating the air defense 98.
operations of the various forces in the Baltic to prevent = operations to wea en NATO de enses in the
mutual interference are unclear. ve would amphibious landing area would be conducted by Pact
expect a theater air defense comman er to coordinate tactical aircraft, including helicopters, and naval gun-
the air defense operations throughout the Western fire. These operations might be augmented by naval
TVD, bombers of the Baltic Fleet Air Force. The regiment of
ack o SU-17 Fitter fighter-bombers of the Baltic Fleet Air
training could lead to major failures in the air defense Force also could provide direct support of Pact
system there. amphibious operations. This regiment might also at-
95. Amphibious Operations.| tack other land targets in the Baltic such as NATO
we be ieve that if naval bases, ports, and air defense installations, and be
initial sea control and air superiority operations were used for countering the large number of Danish and
successful, Pact forces in the Baltic would then con- West German fast patrol boats.
centrate on supporting the Polish (Northern) Front's 99. Because of a shortage of NSWP landing craft,
offensive across northern West Germany and into some Polish and East German amphibious assault
Jutland. Combined amphibious and airborne landings forces probably would use Soviet lift in the initial
are planned against the Danish islands. The Soviets assault. East Germany's current production of amphib-
consider seizure of these islands, especially Zealand, to ious ships, however, will soon provide sufficient lift for
be necessary to prevent naval use of the Baltic by its specially trained motorized rifle regiment. Al-
NATO, to permit passage of Soviet naval forces to and though the two remaining regiments of the East
from the North Sea, and to be able to carry out German motorized rifle division are not trained for
subsequent amphibious operations against southern amphibious operations, we have evidence that they
Norway. Early airborne or amphibious operations are would be lifted by merchant ships as a followup force.
also planned against Bornholm Island to neutralize Because of the relatively short distances between the
NATO intelligence collection facilities there and pre- Danish islands and Pact territory, the shortage of
vent its subsequent use by NATO combat forces. landing craft for rapid reinforcement and resupply of
96. Amphibious operations in the Baltic would in- the landing forces on the islands could be alleviated to
volve ships from the Soviet, Polish, and East German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing
Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces craft, air-cushion vehicles, and possibly helicopters.
would be drawn from the Soviet Baltic Fleet naval 100. The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing division, and Baltic amphibious operation would depend on the
a specially trained regiment of an East German motor- attainment of air superiority and sea control of at least
IV-22

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.