Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use in the Western Theater of Military Operations January 1979,a Soviet b NSWP e Total General Purpose Submarines Cruise Missile Units ......... ..................... 1 - 1 Torpedo Attack Units .......... ............ ......... . 14 2 16 Principal Surface Combatants Cruisers .. ................................. .... . 3 - 3 Destroyers .. ..................................... 8 1 9 Frigates ...... 24 2 26 Amphibious Ships . . 14 23 37 Naval Aircraft d Strike Aircraft .... .... ..................... ...... 78 - 78 Reconnaissance/Flcetronic Warfare Aircraft ... 12 9 21 Tankers ........ ...................... ......... 18 - 18 Fighters/Fighter-Bombers .................... 32 44 76 ASW Fixed-Wing Aircraft ............................. 18 - 18 ASW/Rteconnaissance Helicopters ................... 26 36 62 a Assumes that 60 percent of general purpose submarines, 70 percent of surface combatants, and 85 percent of naval aircraft would be available given four days of preparation. See paragraphs 102 and 103 and table 11-8 in chapter Il for information concerning normal peacetime availability of Soviet naval forces. b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships and 52 reserve submarines. The East German and Polish Navies. Does not include minor surface combatants. Operations of naval aircraft in the Western TVD would be augmented by those of Pact national air defense forces, Frontal Aviation, and Soviet Long Range Aviation. 89. The Soviets probably would find it difficult to and air superiority for the protection of subsequent deal with West-German and Danish submarines in the Pact amphibious operations. Pact air forces probably Baltic, particularly if these forces were well coordinated. would also operate against NATO naval forces in the NATO boats have good shallow-water operating capa- North Sea. Initial strikes by Baltic Fleet bombers bilities, are quiet, and have well-trained crews. More- against NATO air defenses in Denmark and northern over, the Soviets would find it difficult to conduct West Germany might be part of air operations in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations without air Central Europe or at least would be coordinated with superiority. Under the difficult hydrological condi- those operations. Such strikes would facilitate the tions that generally characterize the Baltic, we believe overflight of Soviet naval aircraft en route to NATO that Pact ASW sensors would be inadequate to detect naval targets in the North Sea. submarines at useful ranges except possibly in harbor 91. Achievement of air superiority over the Baltic entrassces and a few close-in coastal areas. would depend largely on the success of the Pact's critical offensive air operations in Central Europe. In addition, Pact naval forces would benefit from effec- tive operations by the national air defense forces. Pact tactical aircraft supporting ground troops in coastal 90. Air Operations. Air superiority would be a areas could also contribute to the contest for air 9. inreatint sPAir sualtictea oratios bA superiority. Fighter cover for surface ships operatingcritical ingredient to Pact Baltic Sea operations. As i h etr atc~oidb tteepneo te part of the effort to gain overall theater air superiority ithe western Baltic would be at the expense of other at the outset of a conflict in Central Europe, initial mssions related to the major air and land battle in the Pact air operations in the Baltic would be directed Central Region, however. against West German and Danish naval bases and 92. About 15 of the major Soviet Baltic Fleet airfields and against NATO naval units already pres- warships, one East German frigate, and one Polish ent in the area in an attempt to establish sea control destroyer have surface-to-air missile systems. These IV-21 35pseeeL
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.