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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979
Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Top
Table IV-4
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use in
the Western Theater of Military Operations
January 1979,a
Soviet b NSWP e Total
General Purpose Submarines
Cruise Missile Units ......... ..................... 1 - 1
Torpedo Attack Units .......... ............ ......... . 14 2 16
Principal Surface Combatants
Cruisers .. ................................. .... . 3 - 3
Destroyers .. ..................................... 8 1 9
Frigates ...... 24 2 26
Amphibious Ships . . 14 23 37
Naval Aircraft d
Strike Aircraft .... .... ..................... ...... 78 - 78
Reconnaissance/Flcetronic Warfare Aircraft ... 12 9 21
Tankers ........ ...................... ......... 18 - 18
Fighters/Fighter-Bombers .................... 32 44 76
ASW Fixed-Wing Aircraft ............................. 18 - 18
ASW/Rteconnaissance Helicopters ................... 26 36 62
a Assumes that 60 percent of general purpose submarines, 70 percent of surface combatants, and 85
percent of naval aircraft would be available given four days of preparation. See paragraphs 102 and 103 and
table 11-8 in chapter Il for information concerning normal peacetime availability of Soviet naval forces.
b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships and 52
reserve submarines.
The East German and Polish Navies. Does not include minor surface combatants.
Operations of naval aircraft in the Western TVD would be augmented by those of Pact national air
defense forces, Frontal Aviation, and Soviet Long Range Aviation.
89. The Soviets probably would find it difficult to and air superiority for the protection of subsequent
deal with West-German and Danish submarines in the Pact amphibious operations. Pact air forces probably
Baltic, particularly if these forces were well coordinated. would also operate against NATO naval forces in the
NATO boats have good shallow-water operating capa- North Sea. Initial strikes by Baltic Fleet bombers
bilities, are quiet, and have well-trained crews. More- against NATO air defenses in Denmark and northern
over, the Soviets would find it difficult to conduct West Germany might be part of air operations in
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations without air Central Europe or at least would be coordinated with
superiority. Under the difficult hydrological condi- those operations. Such strikes would facilitate the
tions that generally characterize the Baltic, we believe overflight of Soviet naval aircraft en route to NATO
that Pact ASW sensors would be inadequate to detect naval targets in the North Sea.
submarines at useful ranges except possibly in harbor 91. Achievement of air superiority over the Baltic
entrassces and a few close-in coastal areas. would depend largely on the success of the Pact's
critical offensive air operations in Central Europe. In
addition, Pact naval forces would benefit from effec-
tive operations by the national air defense forces. Pact
tactical aircraft supporting ground troops in coastal
90. Air Operations. Air superiority would be a areas could also contribute to the contest for air
9. inreatint sPAir sualtictea oratios bA superiority. Fighter cover for surface ships operatingcritical ingredient to Pact Baltic Sea operations. As i h etr atc~oidb tteepneo te
part of the effort to gain overall theater air superiority ithe western Baltic would be at the expense of other
at the outset of a conflict in Central Europe, initial mssions related to the major air and land battle in the
Pact air operations in the Baltic would be directed Central Region, however.
against West German and Danish naval bases and 92. About 15 of the major Soviet Baltic Fleet
airfields and against NATO naval units already pres- warships, one East German frigate, and one Polish
ent in the area in an attempt to establish sea control destroyer have surface-to-air missile systems. These
IV-21
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