Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
lop cret _ J
Naval Operations in the Baltic reinforced by the naval forces of East Germany and
Poland (see table IV-4), the Soviet Baltic Fleet Air
86. Warsaw Pact naval operations in the Baltic
woul be ondctedinhe cntex ofthe verl orce, Long Range Aviation, and elements of the
woctld natcondlctidinfthe codntactiofltheroforces
campaign in the Western Theater of Military Oper- Pact's national air defense and tactical air forces.
ations in Central Europe, and would conform with the 88. Antiship and Antisubmarine Warfare. A
timing and objectives of the Pact's ground and air main objective of the Pact's initial naval operations in
forces, in particular those of the Polish, or Northern, the Baltic would be to destroy NATO submarines, fast
Front of that TVD. 'This front, composed primarily of patrol boats, and mine warfare units because they
Polish forces, but with the support of the Combined could interfere with Pact ship movements, especially
Baltic Fleet, would be initially responsible for captur- west of Bornholm Island, and amphibious operations.
ing northern West Germany and Denmark. Pact planners recognize that the elimination of these
forces in the Baltic would be a difficult task.
87. The broad objectives of Pact naval operations into_qperational availability information reported to
would be to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea the Danes and West Germans probably would
and access to the North Sea to sever NATO's lines of have 23 diesel-powered submarines and 40 fast patrol
communication in the North Sea, and deprive NATO boats, 23 of the latter missile armed, after two to four
of potential launch areas for carrier strikes against Pact days of preparation. Obviously, it would be preferable
air and ground forces in the Central Region. (See for the Pact to destroy these ships at their bases, but a
figure IV-4.) Control of the Baltic Sea would also period of tension would provide time for them to
facilitate subsequent amphibious operations against deploy and disperse, requiring the Pact to locate and
Denmark and West Germany, act as a defensive destroy them at sea or in concealed anchorages. This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of all Pact forces,
communication from NATO attack. The major Pact V
forces involved would consist of the Soviet Baltic Fleet
Illustrative Warsaw Pact Naval and Amphibious Operations Figure IV-4
in the Western TVD
"Sea SWEDEN { 1
Nrhdenial f L
North operations Baltic
Sea N / Sea
i DEt ARS -
Sea denial Nb enh enBr mphibous. U.S.S.R
G G ,* i assaults
operations -ea/ a
Polish (Northern)
S'Front
A St rdam v Berlin Warsaw
NEHERLANPOLAND
EAST
Brussel WEST GERMANY
*
BELGIUM Bonn* GERMANY
LUXEMBOURG f Prague 0 200 kilometers
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
577639 1-79 CIA
TopIV-20 et Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.