Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
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oStreo conduct repeated attacks against fewer airfields, con- experienced tactical aviation aircrews, which would be centrating on those where nuclear delivery aircraft are unavailable for conventional Air Operations. Of the based. The Pact's desire to reduce NATO's nuclear 1,500 tactical aircrews that would be needed to fly the strike potential leads us to believe that the Pact would aircraft made available for an initial assault, some 25 select the latter alternative. NATO maintains 11 air- to 35 percent would be third-class pilots, who by Pact fields in Central Europe where nuclear strike aircraft standards are not qualified to fly combat missions in are based in peacetime: Should NATO disperse its darkness or in adverse daytime conditions. nuclear strike aircraft, however, the Pact's targeting 84. Weather. Because only a small percentage of problem would be compounded. the Pact's tactical aircraft are equipped to navigate at 80. Pact tactics do not appear to maximize the low altitude or to attack targets in poor weather, good potential effectiveness of the force committed to weather with visibilities in excess of several thousand attacking airfields. Evidence reflects a meters would be imperative for the success of the Air Pact tendency to commit the attacking force against Operation. Only Fencer and Backfire aircraft, which both shelters and runways instead of concentrating the are estimated to have full inertial navigation systems attack on one or the other and terrain-avoidance and bomb-navigation radars, would have any appreciable capability to conduct operations in poor visibility. Further, crews operating the Badger bombers would also need good visibility, especially if the Badger bombers were to attempt 81. Aircrew Proficiency. By US standards, Pact penetrating NATO airspace at low altitude, because tactical aircrews generally are not well trained for they lack a terrain avoidance radar. Once in the target combat in the hostile environment they would likely area, however, weather would not be a critical factor encounter in executing the Air Operation. The train- because the Badger is capable of radar-directed ing Pact aircrews receive is largely stereotyped, lacks bombing. realism, and does not prepare them to exploit the full potential of their aircraft and its weapons systems. 85. Summary Assessment. Some in the Intelli- Pact aircrews are not exposed to the sorts of tactics gence Community believe that, on balance, a Pact Air NATO pilots would be expected to employ, nor do Operation would do consideralfe daageto NATO's they practice ground attacks in a realistically simulated air and air defense forces, but probably would not be hostile air defense environment.' so effective as to prevent NATO's air forces from being able to deliver nuclear weapons on a large scale., 82. A key potential drawback affecting the Pact's This conclusion is based on the evaluation of Pact ability to execute the Air Operation effectively could deficiencies and weaknesses contained in paragraphs be the dearth of training Pact aircrews receive for 67-84, above. Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any useful level of confidence on the effectiveness of distances, and their inexperience in operating inde- an Air Operation is possible at this time.' They believe pendently. Peacetime training for Pact aircrews is that such a conclusion should of necessity be based on conducted under strict ground control, which compen- a rigorous analysis of the factors involved which apply sates for the rudimentary navigation instrumentation to both NATO and the Pact, and the interaction of the of most Pact tactical aircraft. Operations over NATO forces of both sides. They observe that no such analysis territory beyond the range of Pact control stations, has been offered to support the conclusion. They therefore, would be flown by aircrews little prepared further believe that the sensitivity of any such analysis to seek out and attack airborne NATO aircraft or to assumptions which have to be based on meager targets on the ground. evidence-Pact weapon allocation and delivery tac- tics, for example-would leave the validity of such an 83. The Pact's ability to provide sufficient numbers analysis open to question. of proficient pilots would be further constrained by the Pact's requirement to maintain a portion of its s The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency force on alert for nuclear operations. Manning this , and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart- force probably requires up to 200 of the Pact's most ment of state. - 6 The holders of this view are the Director,Defense Intelligence See chapter II, paragraphs 69-71, for a further discussion of Pact Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department aircrew training. of the Air Force. IV-19 or~eeek
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.