Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
these prob- probably have to revalidate their location for each lems probably concerned coordinating the employ- successive defense suppression assault. ment of large numbers of aircraft from different Pact air frces.76. Recent improvements mn Pact reconnaissance air forces. capabilities should increase the speed with which 72. Command and control deficiencies might not strike aircraft could react to exploit intelligence giving seriously affect the execution of the initial assault of the location of HAWK batteries. Soviet reconnaissance the Air Operation because the participating air forces units in Central Europe, for example, now have could perform according to a variety of preplanned aircraft equipped with television (Brewer D and options. Serious difficulties could arise in the execution Fishbed H). These aircraft types also have a realtime of subsequent assaults, however, especially if the re- communications link to ground control stations that suIlts of the first assault warranted drastic changes in could direct strike aircraft to newly identified targets. Pact targeting or tactics and the aircrews could not be To collect the requisite data, however, the Brewers notified in a timely fashion. and Fishbeds would have to overfly NATO territory 73, A and expose themselves to NATO air defenses, includ- 73.l n additional potential drawback in the Pact's ing the HAWKS. Aircraft equipped with sidelooking ability to employ its air forces effectively deep within radar, such as the Foxbat D, are also available and NATO terrtory lies in the dependency of Pact tactical could partially alleviate this problem by remaining in aircraft on ground control stations for navigation. Pact airspace. We believe these aircraft would have to fhese aircraft would have to fly to remain withir line- land, however, in order for the data to be processed of-sight of these control stations andi thus woul and exploited. become more vulnerable to NATO's air defenses; or fly low, where they would have a better chance of 77. Defense Suppression: NADGE and TACS. surviving but would be more likely to lose contact with NATO's 17 NADGE radar sites in Central Europe, their ground control stations. The only Pact ground which are fixed and soft, would be highly vulnerable attack aircraft that can effectively navigate without to attack during the Air Operation. Attacks against the such assistance are the Fencer A, the Flogger D, and US TACS radars, however, would be more difficult the Fitter C/D. These aircraft currently constitute because they are field transportable and camouflaged. about 40 percent of the ground attack aircraft the Pact Munitions which the Pact would be likely to use has for operations in Central Europe. against either NADGE or TACS sites include 74. Pact air forces generally are dependent on unguided bombs, rockets, and antiradiation missiles. electronic control systems both for navigating to dis- 78. Airfield Attack. Whatever success the Pact tant targets and for conducting aerial intercepts, and would have in eliminating NATO airpower as an thus are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures. obstacle to a Pact victory would hinge largely on Pact Pact electronic systems susceptible to jamming include capabilities to destroy aircraft protected by shelters or radars used to vector aircraft in air-to-air engage- to put runways and taxiways at NATO airfields out of ments, short-range navigation systems, ground-to-air commission. The Pact's current capability to achieve communications systems, Doppler navigation systems the objectives it has set for the Air Operation through aboard the Flogger D and Fitter D, and bomb/naviga- airfield attacks is judged to be limited for two reasons. tion systems on Soviet bombers. One is the size of the force the Pact apparently intends 75. Defense Suppression: HAWKs. The number to commit to this task. The other is the tactics the Pact of LRA bombers able to reach NATO airfields, the apparently mtends to employ. principal objectives of an Air Operation assault, would 79. We calculate that about 15 of the 43 main depend primarily on the effectiveness of Pact efforts operating bases which NATO normally maintains in to suppress NATO air defenses, especially HAWKs. peacetime could be attacked in a single assault during Since the tactical aircraft assigned this responsibility the Air Operation. This assessment is based on the are currently equipped mainly with direct attack number of LRA and tactical air regiments the Pact weapons, the HAWKS would have to be visually would be likely to commit to airfield attacks and on identified by Pact aircrews before they could be Pact planning factors which indicate that one regi- struck. The difficulty of this task would be compounded ment of aircraft would be assigned to attack a single considerably if NATO were alerted and the HAWKs NATO airfield. In conducting the Air Operation, were moved from their peacetime dispositions. More- therefore, Pact strategists would face a difficult choice. over, because the HAWKs are mobile, the Pact would They could attack each of NATO's major bases once or IV-18 o5p-eeet..
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.