Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

these prob- probably have to revalidate their location for each
lems probably concerned coordinating the employ- successive defense suppression assault.
ment of large numbers of aircraft from different Pact
air frces.76. Recent improvements mn Pact reconnaissance
air forces. capabilities should increase the speed with which
72. Command and control deficiencies might not strike aircraft could react to exploit intelligence giving
seriously affect the execution of the initial assault of the location of HAWK batteries. Soviet reconnaissance
the Air Operation because the participating air forces units in Central Europe, for example, now have
could perform according to a variety of preplanned aircraft equipped with television (Brewer D and
options. Serious difficulties could arise in the execution Fishbed H). These aircraft types also have a realtime
of subsequent assaults, however, especially if the re- communications link to ground control stations that
suIlts of the first assault warranted drastic changes in could direct strike aircraft to newly identified targets.
Pact targeting or tactics and the aircrews could not be To collect the requisite data, however, the Brewers
notified in a timely fashion. and Fishbeds would have to overfly NATO territory
73, A and expose themselves to NATO air defenses, includ-
73.l n additional potential drawback in the Pact's ing the HAWKS. Aircraft equipped with sidelooking
ability to employ its air forces effectively deep within radar, such as the Foxbat D, are also available and
NATO terrtory lies in the dependency of Pact tactical could partially alleviate this problem by remaining in
aircraft on ground control stations for navigation. Pact airspace. We believe these aircraft would have to
fhese aircraft would have to fly to remain withir line- land, however, in order for the data to be processed
of-sight of these control stations andi thus woul and exploited.
become more vulnerable to NATO's air defenses; or
fly low, where they would have a better chance of 77. Defense Suppression: NADGE and TACS.
surviving but would be more likely to lose contact with NATO's 17 NADGE radar sites in Central Europe,
their ground control stations. The only Pact ground which are fixed and soft, would be highly vulnerable
attack aircraft that can effectively navigate without to attack during the Air Operation. Attacks against the
such assistance are the Fencer A, the Flogger D, and US TACS radars, however, would be more difficult
the Fitter C/D. These aircraft currently constitute because they are field transportable and camouflaged.
about 40 percent of the ground attack aircraft the Pact Munitions which the Pact would be likely to use
has for operations in Central Europe. against either NADGE or TACS sites include
74. Pact air forces generally are dependent on unguided bombs, rockets, and antiradiation missiles.
electronic control systems both for navigating to dis- 78. Airfield Attack. Whatever success the Pact
tant targets and for conducting aerial intercepts, and would have in eliminating NATO airpower as an
thus are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures. obstacle to a Pact victory would hinge largely on Pact
Pact electronic systems susceptible to jamming include capabilities to destroy aircraft protected by shelters or
radars used to vector aircraft in air-to-air engage- to put runways and taxiways at NATO airfields out of
ments, short-range navigation systems, ground-to-air commission. The Pact's current capability to achieve
communications systems, Doppler navigation systems the objectives it has set for the Air Operation through
aboard the Flogger D and Fitter D, and bomb/naviga- airfield attacks is judged to be limited for two reasons.
tion systems on Soviet bombers. One is the size of the force the Pact apparently intends
75. Defense Suppression: HAWKs. The number to commit to this task. The other is the tactics the Pact
of LRA bombers able to reach NATO airfields, the apparently mtends to employ.
principal objectives of an Air Operation assault, would 79. We calculate that about 15 of the 43 main
depend primarily on the effectiveness of Pact efforts operating bases which NATO normally maintains in
to suppress NATO air defenses, especially HAWKs. peacetime could be attacked in a single assault during
Since the tactical aircraft assigned this responsibility the Air Operation. This assessment is based on the
are currently equipped mainly with direct attack number of LRA and tactical air regiments the Pact
weapons, the HAWKS would have to be visually would be likely to commit to airfield attacks and on
identified by Pact aircrews before they could be Pact planning factors which indicate that one regi-
struck. The difficulty of this task would be compounded ment of aircraft would be assigned to attack a single
considerably if NATO were alerted and the HAWKs NATO airfield. In conducting the Air Operation,
were moved from their peacetime dispositions. More- therefore, Pact strategists would face a difficult choice.
over, because the HAWKs are mobile, the Pact would They could attack each of NATO's major bases once or
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