Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

deep in NATO territory, while Fishbed and Brewer an attack. This same analysis evinces a keen apprecia-
aircraft would cover targets closer to Pact borders. tion of NATO's ability to detect preparations, especially
64. Potential Wfectiveness. We have no direct the movement of aircraft, and react quickly.
evidence of Pact expectations regarding aircraft losses
during the Air Operation. We believe, however, that
the Pact probably would not measure the success of
the Air Operation in these terms. Substantial Pact 69. Surprise would affect the Pact's chances of
losses might be viewed as tolerable to Pact planners pinning down aircraft at NATO's bases more than it
contemplating a short, decisive conflict, even if the Air would the Pact's ability to destroy aircraft. NATO has
Operation managed only to keep NATO's air forces concrete shelters available for the protection of about
preoccupied with fending for their own survival dur- 70 percent of the combat aircraft it normally main-
ing the first few days of hostilities. With their atten- tains in Central Europe. Consequently, until the Pact
tion so diverted, NATO's air forces could have diffi- equips its air forces with large numbers of precision
culty countering Pact ground forces during the most guided munitions suitable for attacking shelters, most
critical phases of their initial operations-the break- of NATO's aircraft would have considerable protec-
through and penetration of NATO's forward defenses. tion from conventional weapons. The advantage of
65. How the Pact would measure the degree to surprise, therefore, lies in reducing the number of
which the Air Operation would contribute to Pact aircraft which NATO can get airborne by cratering
nuclear superiority is even less clear. Pact strategists the runways and taxiways.
may regard this objective as being subsumed under 70. The Soviets have considered minimizing
that of air superiority because they view NATO's air NATO's warning time with a preemptive attack in
forces as the principal component of NATO's theater which Pact air forces take off from their home bases
nuclear capability. and fly the most direct route to their targets.
66. The ability of the Pact's air forces to reduce
significantly the effectiveness of NATO's air and
theater nuclear forces would be affected by a variety more NATO
of factors. Chief among these factors are Pact capabili- aircraft would be caught on the ground using this
ties to achieve surprise, effectively coordinate the tactic because of the reduction in the Pact's flight time
employment of large numbers of aircraft, suppress to NATO airfields.
NATO's air defenses and destroy aircraft, and crater the Pact would also stan to lose more aircraft because
runways and taxiways at NATO's airfields. Other of their greater exposure to NATO ground defenses. In
important factors include the proficiency of Pact the final analysis, the corridor approach
aircrews and the ability of Pact air forces to perform
their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred
method of attacking NATO's air defenses during the
.67. Surprise. Complete, or strategic, surprise by the Air Operation.
Pact would be unlikely, in view of the extensive
preparations it almost certainly would feel compelled 71. Management and Coordination. The Pact's
to make to enchance the prospects for success of a ability to orchestrate an Air Operation requiring pre-
general offensive in Central Europe and-above cisely timed, multiple sorties by Soviet bombers flying
all-to reduce the risks posed by the threat of escala- out of the USSR and the tactical and national air
tion. For these purposes the Pact, in addition to defense forces of several different nationalities operat-
readying its air forces, would take steps to mobilize ing from within Eastern Europe is open to question.
and move its ground and naval forces, and to put its Although the Pact is believed to have the command,
political, economic, and civil defense systems on a war control, and communications necessary for such an
footing. operation, the full system has never been tested. There
is some evidence which indicates that the Pact's ability
68. to coordinate such an undertaking continues to be
deficient.
Soviet planners think more in terms of
tactical surprise, or the sort of surprise which is
attained in selecting the place, timing, and weight of
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to