“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
deep in NATO territory, while Fishbed and Brewer an attack. This same analysis evinces a keen apprecia-
aircraft would cover targets closer to Pact borders. tion of NATO's ability to detect preparations, especially
64. Potential Wfectiveness. We have no direct the movement of aircraft, and react quickly.
evidence of Pact expectations regarding aircraft losses
during the Air Operation. We believe, however, that
the Pact probably would not measure the success of
the Air Operation in these terms. Substantial Pact 69. Surprise would affect the Pact's chances of
losses might be viewed as tolerable to Pact planners pinning down aircraft at NATO's bases more than it
contemplating a short, decisive conflict, even if the Air would the Pact's ability to destroy aircraft. NATO has
Operation managed only to keep NATO's air forces concrete shelters available for the protection of about
preoccupied with fending for their own survival dur- 70 percent of the combat aircraft it normally main-
ing the first few days of hostilities. With their atten- tains in Central Europe. Consequently, until the Pact
tion so diverted, NATO's air forces could have diffi- equips its air forces with large numbers of precision
culty countering Pact ground forces during the most guided munitions suitable for attacking shelters, most
critical phases of their initial operations-the break- of NATO's aircraft would have considerable protec-
through and penetration of NATO's forward defenses. tion from conventional weapons. The advantage of
65. How the Pact would measure the degree to surprise, therefore, lies in reducing the number of
which the Air Operation would contribute to Pact aircraft which NATO can get airborne by cratering
nuclear superiority is even less clear. Pact strategists the runways and taxiways.
may regard this objective as being subsumed under 70. The Soviets have considered minimizing
that of air superiority because they view NATO's air NATO's warning time with a preemptive attack in
forces as the principal component of NATO's theater which Pact air forces take off from their home bases
nuclear capability. and fly the most direct route to their targets.
66. The ability of the Pact's air forces to reduce
significantly the effectiveness of NATO's air and
theater nuclear forces would be affected by a variety more NATO
of factors. Chief among these factors are Pact capabili- aircraft would be caught on the ground using this
ties to achieve surprise, effectively coordinate the tactic because of the reduction in the Pact's flight time
employment of large numbers of aircraft, suppress to NATO airfields.
NATO's air defenses and destroy aircraft, and crater the Pact would also stan to lose more aircraft because
runways and taxiways at NATO's airfields. Other of their greater exposure to NATO ground defenses. In
important factors include the proficiency of Pact the final analysis, the corridor approach
aircrews and the ability of Pact air forces to perform
their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred
method of attacking NATO's air defenses during the
.67. Surprise. Complete, or strategic, surprise by the Air Operation.
Pact would be unlikely, in view of the extensive
preparations it almost certainly would feel compelled 71. Management and Coordination. The Pact's
to make to enchance the prospects for success of a ability to orchestrate an Air Operation requiring pre-
general offensive in Central Europe and-above cisely timed, multiple sorties by Soviet bombers flying
all-to reduce the risks posed by the threat of escala- out of the USSR and the tactical and national air
tion. For these purposes the Pact, in addition to defense forces of several different nationalities operat-
readying its air forces, would take steps to mobilize ing from within Eastern Europe is open to question.
and move its ground and naval forces, and to put its Although the Pact is believed to have the command,
political, economic, and civil defense systems on a war control, and communications necessary for such an
footing. operation, the full system has never been tested. There
is some evidence which indicates that the Pact's ability
68. to coordinate such an undertaking continues to be
deficient.
Soviet planners think more in terms of
tactical surprise, or the sort of surprise which is
attained in selecting the place, timing, and weight of
IV-17
to