Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
Top 56. Tactical aircraft attacking HAWK units would aircraft, orbiting over East Germany and Czechoslova- seek to destroy their fire control radars and associated kia at 6,000 meters, could cover most NATO ground- electronics vans by using cannon fire and unguided based radars throughout West Germany. bombs anl rockets. Area denial weapons such as cluster bomb units are also known to be in the Pact 60. Escort jamming for the main strike force would inventory and would facilitate an attack on dispersed be provided by LRA's specialized ECM aircraft, targets. Pact tactical aircraft could also use the AS-7 which carry both jammers and chaff. About 20 per- Kerry tactical air-to-surface missile, but its effective- cent of the LRA Badger force opposite NATO (65 ness is limited by its small warhead, poor accuracy, Badger H/J aircraft) currently has a dedicated ECM and the vulnerability it imposes on the delivery air- role. About 40 Brewer E aircraft in Soviet Frontal craft because of the requirement to guide it to the Aviation arc also available to provide standoff or target. Some attacks might also be carried out by escort jamming support. All Soviet bombers and a few tactical aircraft equipped with AS-10 laser-guided or types of Pact fighters are equipped with onboard AS-9 antiradiation missiles. jammers for use against air intercept and surface-to-air missile radars. Large numbers of Pact tactical aircraft 57. In recent years, LRA bombers may have simu- can also be equipped with ECM pods, but this would lated attacks against NATO's Air Defense Ground reduce their weapons-carrying capability. Environment (NADGE) radars using longer range antiradiation missiles. It would be logical for an attack . 6L The main strike force would follow closely the on these major air defense radar sites, and on the field- defense suppression raids carried out by tactical air transportable tactical air control system (TACS) ra- units and would be intended to deliver the brunt of dars, to precede the main defense suppression effort. the attack against NATO airfields, command and Some missile-equipped LRA bombers could also be control facilities, and nuclear-related targets. LRA used against NATO air defense missile sites, especially bombers would constitute the primary attacking force. those protecting important LRA targets in the NATO Soviet planning factors indicate that the bomber force rear areas. is large enough to attack simultaneously all 1I airfields in Central Europe which support NATO's nuclear 58. A related aspect of the Air Operation would be delivery aircraft in peacetime. Some tactical fighter- a large-scale, coordinated jamming effort aimed at bombers would also be used to attack airfields. The disrupting NATO's air defense radars and comnuni- increased combat radius, payloads, and improved mu- cations links. The Pact is expected to depend heavily nitions of late-model Pact fighter-bombers enhance on airborne as well as ground-based electronic counter- their effectiveness in this role. measures (ECM) to facilitate penetration of NATO airspace. Techniques are expected to include the employment of both chaff and broadband noise jam- ming. The operating frequencies of current NATO air defense radars are well known and are covered by existing Pact noise jammers. Pact ground force ECM units would probably concentrate on the ultrahigh- frequency (UHF) ground-to-air and air-to-air commu- nications used to control NATO interceptor oper- ations. Line-of-sight considerations, however, would probably limit their effectiveness against NATO air defense radars. 59. Jamming of NATO's various early warning, 63. Aerial reconnaissance would be conducted dur- ground-controlled intercept, and acquisition radars ing the Air Operation, primarily by tactical aircraft, to would be the responsibility of airborne electronic- provide Pact commanders with intelligence needed for warfare-equipped aircraft such as the AN-12 Cub subsequent targeting and to determine the number C/D. This aircraft, carrying up to 20 transmitters, can and scope of succeeding assaults. The Pact has three jam all NATO aircraft control and warning radar primary types of tactical aircraft available for recon- frequencies. Because of its vulnerability, the Cub C/D naissance: the MIG-25 Foxbat B/D, the YAK-28R would probably be used in a standoff jamming role. Brewer D, and MIG-21R Fishbed H. Foxbats would We estimate, for example, that as few as 10 of these probably photograph results of strikes against airfields IV-16 Top Secre
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.