Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Top e ment prior to, coincidental with, or after launching the possible, would not be practicable for combat initial assault. The Pact could also expand the area of operations. employment of some of its tactical aircraft based deep in Pact territory by having the aircraft recover at bases 52. Preparations.We estimate that it would take a closer to the West German border. This would avoid minimum of 48 hours for the Pact air armies in alerting NATO by deploying units forward before Central Europe to deploy their wartime command launching airstrikes but would strain the resources of post structure and establish the command and control the recovering airfields unless provision was made for required to engage in offensive air combat operations augmenting logistical support. in support of a front commander. We believe, how- ever, that it would take a total of about 72 hours to 50. The reequipment of Pact air forces in recent make the command and control preparations (includ- years with newer, longer range aircraft has resulted in ing the updating of battle plans) needed to support a a significant increase in the number of aircraft that coordinated theaterwide air offensive, including LRA, could participate in an initial assault without first against NATO airfields, nuclear weapon sites, and deploying forward. other priority targets as envisaged in Pact plans. 'act plan- ning continues to reflect initiation of the Air Opera- 53. The other requisite preparations for a major tion from a deployment posture such as that illustrated offensive action could probably be accomplished with- in the "limited reinforcement" option. This evidence in the time specified above. These would include the reflects an intent to move the Polish tactical air army callup of reservists, final maintenance and the arming closer to NATO territory and to introduce a Soviet and fueling of aircraft, and the activation of additional light bomber division from the Baltic Military District airfields for dispersal or recovery purposes. Should the into East Germany before hostilities start. The Polish Soviets decide to deploy aircraft from the western tactical air force is still largely equipped with obsoles- USSR into the forward area, they probably could cent short-range aircraft that cannot reach NATO complete this deployment within 72 hours of the targets and return to their home bases. I decision to do so. 54. Acquiring and processing timely intelligence on NATO forces also would be required before beginning the Air Operation, especially if NATO had been alerted. The Pact would almost certainly attempt to learn the location of air defense and surface-to-surface tactical missile units which had moved to wartime positions. An effort would also be mounted to identify airfields used for dispersal, particularly by nuclear- capable aircraft. 5]. the size of the force illustrated in the "limited reinforcement" 55. Combat Operations. The initial objective of case-some 1,900 aircraft-would be sufficient to the Air Operation would be to suppress NATO's air target in a single attack all NATO airfields in Central defenses-especially HAWK missile batteries-in sev- Europe which currently support nuclear strike units, eral corridors. (See figure IV-3.) The creation of as well as 40 percent of NATO's HAWK sites and 30 corridors would obviate the need to suppress all 84 of percent of NATO's primary air defense early warning NATO's HAWK batteries currently in Central Europe and control radars. The 800 or so tactical aircraft that and allow more tactical aircraft to be employed would remain in the western USSR after a limited against primary targets such as airfields, surface-to- reinforcement was carried out would probably serve as surface missile sites, and command and control facili- an immediately available reserve force. The forward ties. If, for example, three corridors were established, deployment of these aircraft before hostilitites would an estimatsd 30 to 35 HAWK sites would have to be enable the Pact to strike a greater number of targets in suppressed or eliminated. an initial air assault. These aircraft, however, would be this number o sites could-be sup- exposed to NATO strikes because the Pact does not pressed by about 200 fighter-bombers.| have enough shelters to accommodate them, and NATO's Nike-Hercules sites would not doubling up aircraft in existing shelter space, though be subject to a major suppression effort. IV-14
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.