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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Table IV-3
Illustrative Allocation of Pact Combat Aircraft for Initial Use in the Western
Theater of Military Operations
January 1979
Illustrative Deployment Postures
Forces Limited Full
in Place Reinforcement- Reinforcement b
Total Aircraft Available ..... ........................ 2,995 3,505 4,295
Of Which for:
Air Operationsd Including . ....................... 1,565 1,890 2,450
LRA ........ .............. ....................... 350 350 350
Tactical Com bat ............. ....................... 970 1,210 1,740
Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare .... 245 330 360
Ground Support,d Including ........... ..... .... 300 385 515
Tactical Combat ................................ 240 305 425
Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare 60 80 90
National Air Defense....... ...... .. ............. 775 775 775
Nuclear Rescrver Including ..... 355 455 555
L RA ........................ .... - 175 175 175
Tactical ................ ..... ...... ......... . 180 280 380
Includes aircraft in place plus the deployment forward of an East German wing (35 aircraft), one
Czechoslovak regiment (35 aircraft), seven Polish regiments (335 aircraft), and three Soviet fighter/light-
bomber regiments (.105 aircraft) from the USSR.
b Includes aircraft in "limited reinforcement" categri plus about-800 additional aifcraft fromnthe
USSR.
Normally only about 85 percent of these totals would be available for sustained operations.
d Allocation of tactical combat aircraft between ground forces support and the Air Operation is based
on a 20-80 split after nuclear alert forces are withheld, This allocation is based on documentary evidence.
Although we have no direct evidence, a 20-80 allocation between ground support and the Air Operation was
also applied to tactical reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft.
Allocation is based on national air defense subordination.
r A nuclear reserve in LRA of one-third of its forces is estimated from documentary evidence. The
number of tactical aircraft withheld in the "forces in place" option is based on exercise evidence, while each
of the reinforcement options assumes an additional allocation of 100 and 200 aircraft.
tactical aircraft based in the western USSR are East Germany from the Baltic Military District
not included in this illustrative posture.A of the USSR.
- Limited Reinforcement. Forces allocated to the - Full Reinforcement. Aircraft allocated to the
Air Operation in this posture-some 1,890 air- Air Operation in this posture would total about
craft-would include those described above and 2,450. They would include all those noted in the
an additional 220 NSWP aircraft belonging to "limited reinforcement" illustration and addi-
units which would be moved to within range of tional tactical aircraft that would be moved
NATO targets and about 105 aircraft moved into forward from the western USSR.
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant 49. The Pact probably has contingency plans for
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe initiating the Air Operation from any of the postures
that, this illustrative posture notwithstanding, some tactical air- described above. Such plans probably involve various
craft based in the USSR-for example, SU-24 Fencers-could be
launched directly from their hione bases in an Air Operation. See schemes for timing the movement of additional air-
figures 11-13 and 11-14 of chapter II for detailed information on the craft to bases within striking range of NATO targets.
combat performance of Soviet tactical aircraft. For example, the Pact could undertake such move-
IV-13
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.