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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Table IV-3
Illustrative Allocation of Pact Combat Aircraft for Initial Use in the Western
Theater of Military Operations
January 1979
Illustrative Deployment Postures
Forces Limited Full
in Place Reinforcement- Reinforcement b
Total Aircraft Available ..... ........................ 2,995 3,505 4,295
Of Which for:
Air Operationsd Including . ....................... 1,565 1,890 2,450
LRA ........ .............. ....................... 350 350 350
Tactical Com bat ............. ....................... 970 1,210 1,740
Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare .... 245 330 360
Ground Support,d Including ........... ..... .... 300 385 515
Tactical Combat ................................ 240 305 425
Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare 60 80 90
National Air Defense....... ...... .. ............. 775 775 775
Nuclear Rescrver Including ..... 355 455 555
L RA ........................ .... - 175 175 175
Tactical ................ ..... ...... ......... . 180 280 380
Includes aircraft in place plus the deployment forward of an East German wing (35 aircraft), one
Czechoslovak regiment (35 aircraft), seven Polish regiments (335 aircraft), and three Soviet fighter/light-
bomber regiments (.105 aircraft) from the USSR.
b Includes aircraft in "limited reinforcement" categri plus about-800 additional aifcraft fromnthe
USSR.
Normally only about 85 percent of these totals would be available for sustained operations.
d Allocation of tactical combat aircraft between ground forces support and the Air Operation is based
on a 20-80 split after nuclear alert forces are withheld, This allocation is based on documentary evidence.
Although we have no direct evidence, a 20-80 allocation between ground support and the Air Operation was
also applied to tactical reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft.
Allocation is based on national air defense subordination.
r A nuclear reserve in LRA of one-third of its forces is estimated from documentary evidence. The
number of tactical aircraft withheld in the "forces in place" option is based on exercise evidence, while each
of the reinforcement options assumes an additional allocation of 100 and 200 aircraft.
tactical aircraft based in the western USSR are East Germany from the Baltic Military District
not included in this illustrative posture.A of the USSR.
- Limited Reinforcement. Forces allocated to the - Full Reinforcement. Aircraft allocated to the
Air Operation in this posture-some 1,890 air- Air Operation in this posture would total about
craft-would include those described above and 2,450. They would include all those noted in the
an additional 220 NSWP aircraft belonging to "limited reinforcement" illustration and addi-
units which would be moved to within range of tional tactical aircraft that would be moved
NATO targets and about 105 aircraft moved into forward from the western USSR.
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant 49. The Pact probably has contingency plans for
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe initiating the Air Operation from any of the postures
that, this illustrative posture notwithstanding, some tactical air- described above. Such plans probably involve various
craft based in the USSR-for example, SU-24 Fencers-could be
launched directly from their hione bases in an Air Operation. See schemes for timing the movement of additional air-
figures 11-13 and 11-14 of chapter II for detailed information on the craft to bases within striking range of NATO targets.
combat performance of Soviet tactical aircraft. For example, the Pact could undertake such move-
IV-13
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.