Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
Table IV-3 Illustrative Allocation of Pact Combat Aircraft for Initial Use in the Western Theater of Military Operations January 1979 Illustrative Deployment Postures Forces Limited Full in Place Reinforcement- Reinforcement b Total Aircraft Available ..... ........................ 2,995 3,505 4,295 Of Which for: Air Operationsd Including . ....................... 1,565 1,890 2,450 LRA ........ .............. ....................... 350 350 350 Tactical Com bat ............. ....................... 970 1,210 1,740 Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare .... 245 330 360 Ground Support,d Including ........... ..... .... 300 385 515 Tactical Combat ................................ 240 305 425 Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare 60 80 90 National Air Defense....... ...... .. ............. 775 775 775 Nuclear Rescrver Including ..... 355 455 555 L RA ........................ .... - 175 175 175 Tactical ................ ..... ...... ......... . 180 280 380 Includes aircraft in place plus the deployment forward of an East German wing (35 aircraft), one Czechoslovak regiment (35 aircraft), seven Polish regiments (335 aircraft), and three Soviet fighter/light- bomber regiments (.105 aircraft) from the USSR. b Includes aircraft in "limited reinforcement" categri plus about-800 additional aifcraft fromnthe USSR. Normally only about 85 percent of these totals would be available for sustained operations. d Allocation of tactical combat aircraft between ground forces support and the Air Operation is based on a 20-80 split after nuclear alert forces are withheld, This allocation is based on documentary evidence. Although we have no direct evidence, a 20-80 allocation between ground support and the Air Operation was also applied to tactical reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft. Allocation is based on national air defense subordination. r A nuclear reserve in LRA of one-third of its forces is estimated from documentary evidence. The number of tactical aircraft withheld in the "forces in place" option is based on exercise evidence, while each of the reinforcement options assumes an additional allocation of 100 and 200 aircraft. tactical aircraft based in the western USSR are East Germany from the Baltic Military District not included in this illustrative posture.A of the USSR. - Limited Reinforcement. Forces allocated to the - Full Reinforcement. Aircraft allocated to the Air Operation in this posture-some 1,890 air- Air Operation in this posture would total about craft-would include those described above and 2,450. They would include all those noted in the an additional 220 NSWP aircraft belonging to "limited reinforcement" illustration and addi- units which would be moved to within range of tional tactical aircraft that would be moved NATO targets and about 105 aircraft moved into forward from the western USSR. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant 49. The Pact probably has contingency plans for Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe initiating the Air Operation from any of the postures that, this illustrative posture notwithstanding, some tactical air- described above. Such plans probably involve various craft based in the USSR-for example, SU-24 Fencers-could be launched directly from their hione bases in an Air Operation. See schemes for timing the movement of additional air- figures 11-13 and 11-14 of chapter II for detailed information on the craft to bases within striking range of NATO targets. combat performance of Soviet tactical aircraft. For example, the Pact could undertake such move- IV-13 T6--Sret --
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.