Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Table IV-3
Illustrative Allocation of Pact Combat Aircraft for Initial Use in the Western
Theater of Military Operations
January 1979
Illustrative Deployment Postures
Forces Limited Full
in Place Reinforcement- Reinforcement b
Total Aircraft Available ..... ........................ 2,995 3,505 4,295
Of Which for:
Air Operationsd Including . ....................... 1,565 1,890 2,450
LRA ........ .............. ....................... 350 350 350
Tactical Com bat ............. ....................... 970 1,210 1,740
Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare .... 245 330 360
Ground Support,d Including ........... ..... .... 300 385 515
Tactical Combat ................................ 240 305 425
Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare 60 80 90
National Air Defense....... ...... .. ............. 775 775 775
Nuclear Rescrver Including ..... 355 455 555
L RA ........................ .... - 175 175 175
Tactical ................ ..... ...... ......... . 180 280 380
Includes aircraft in place plus the deployment forward of an East German wing (35 aircraft), one
Czechoslovak regiment (35 aircraft), seven Polish regiments (335 aircraft), and three Soviet fighter/light-
bomber regiments (.105 aircraft) from the USSR.
b Includes aircraft in "limited reinforcement" categri plus about-800 additional aifcraft fromnthe
USSR.
Normally only about 85 percent of these totals would be available for sustained operations.
d Allocation of tactical combat aircraft between ground forces support and the Air Operation is based
on a 20-80 split after nuclear alert forces are withheld, This allocation is based on documentary evidence.
Although we have no direct evidence, a 20-80 allocation between ground support and the Air Operation was
also applied to tactical reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft.
Allocation is based on national air defense subordination.
r A nuclear reserve in LRA of one-third of its forces is estimated from documentary evidence. The
number of tactical aircraft withheld in the "forces in place" option is based on exercise evidence, while each
of the reinforcement options assumes an additional allocation of 100 and 200 aircraft.
tactical aircraft based in the western USSR are East Germany from the Baltic Military District
not included in this illustrative posture.A of the USSR.
- Limited Reinforcement. Forces allocated to the - Full Reinforcement. Aircraft allocated to the
Air Operation in this posture-some 1,890 air- Air Operation in this posture would total about
craft-would include those described above and 2,450. They would include all those noted in the
an additional 220 NSWP aircraft belonging to "limited reinforcement" illustration and addi-
units which would be moved to within range of tional tactical aircraft that would be moved
NATO targets and about 105 aircraft moved into forward from the western USSR.
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant 49. The Pact probably has contingency plans for
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe initiating the Air Operation from any of the postures
that, this illustrative posture notwithstanding, some tactical air- described above. Such plans probably involve various
craft based in the USSR-for example, SU-24 Fencers-could be
launched directly from their hione bases in an Air Operation. See schemes for timing the movement of additional air-
figures 11-13 and 11-14 of chapter II for detailed information on the craft to bases within striking range of NATO targets.
combat performance of Soviet tactical aircraft. For example, the Pact could undertake such move-
IV-13
T6--Sret --