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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
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would be used to suppress air defenses, especially 47. Forces. The Pact has approximately 3,000 tac-
IIAWK batteries. They would also be expected to tical aircraft, 775 national air defense fighters, and 525
provide fighter cover for attack aircraft, to pro- LRA bombers available for use in Central Europe.
vide reconnaissance and radioelectronic combat (See table IV-2.) Pact writings and exercise scenarios
(REC) support, and to attack surface-to-surface lead us to estimate that, of these aircraft, about 350
missile units and some NATO airfields. Non- LRA bombers and 1,200 to 2,100 tactical aircraft
Soviet Warsaw Pact national air defense fighters would be made available for use in the Air Operation.
would escort Soviet bombers over Pact territory The remaining aircraft would be used to defend Pact
and provide strategic air defense of their territory and to provide direct combat support to Pact
homelands. ground forces. Some of the remaining aircraft would
- Some fighter-bomber and bomber aircraft would also be kept in readiness for the transition to nuclear
be withheld for use in nuclear operations, and a war.
small number of tactical aircraft would be avail-
able for direct support of the ground forces. 48. The number of aircraft available for the initial
assault of an Air Operation would vary according to45. Pact planners would regard attacks against the extent to which the Pact mobilized and moved
NATO airfields as the principal way of gaining air additional tactical air units within range of NATO
superiority. They would intend such attacks to damage targets. Following are three illustrative postures from
runways and other airfield facilities and thus degrade which the Pact could launch an Air Operation and an
NATO's ability to operate its air forces effectively. estimate of the number of aircraft that would be
They would also expect airfield attacks to account for available in each after the Pact had made provision (as
most of the aircraft NATO would lose during the Air shown in table IV-3) for possible nuclear escalation
Operation. Pact fighter and ground-based air defenses and air support of its ground forces
would be expected, however, to contribute to the
battle for air superiority by inflicting significant losses - Forces in Place. Aircraft allocated to the Air
on NATO's air forces in the air, Operations in this posture would be limited to
46. In its effort to achieve nuclear superiority, the those considered by Pact air force planners to
Pact would probably concentrate its attacks on those have a combat radius that would enable the
bases from which NATO nuclear delivery aircraft aircraft to strike targets from, and return to, their
would operate. Tactical missile launchers would also home bases. Some 1,565 aircraft-350 USSR-
be high-priority targets, but they would be difficult to based LRA bombers and 1,215 tactical aircraft
locate and we believe that operations against them belonging to Soviet and NSWP units in Central
would not involve large numbers of aircraft. Europe-would fall into this category. Soviet
Table IV-2
Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft Available for Use in the Western Theater of Military Operations a
In Central Europe b In the USSR
- - - ---- - - Grand
Soviet NSWP Total Tactical LRA d Total Total
Tactical Aircraft
Fighters . ............................ .......... 630 235 865 360 - 360 1,225
Fighter-Bombers ........................... .... 405 465 870 435 - 435 1,305
Light Bombers ........... ---............. ..... - - - 30 - 30 30
Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Aircraft 140 190 330 105 - 105 435
Total .......................,... .......... 1,175 890 2,065 930 -- 930 2,995
National Air Defense Interceptors.- - 775 775 - - - 775
Long Range Aviation Bombers ....................... - - - - 525 525 525
Total ... .................. .......... 1,175 1,665 2,840 930 525 1,455 4,295
Combat aircraft in combat units. Excludes all trainers and combat aircraft in training or flying-school units.
Pact air forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Tactical air forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts.
d TU-16 Badgers, TU-22 Blinders, and Backfires in the Northwest and Southwest Bomber Commands.
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IV-12
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.