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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
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would be used to suppress air defenses, especially 47. Forces. The Pact has approximately 3,000 tac-
IIAWK batteries. They would also be expected to tical aircraft, 775 national air defense fighters, and 525
provide fighter cover for attack aircraft, to pro- LRA bombers available for use in Central Europe.
vide reconnaissance and radioelectronic combat (See table IV-2.) Pact writings and exercise scenarios
(REC) support, and to attack surface-to-surface lead us to estimate that, of these aircraft, about 350
missile units and some NATO airfields. Non- LRA bombers and 1,200 to 2,100 tactical aircraft
Soviet Warsaw Pact national air defense fighters would be made available for use in the Air Operation.
would escort Soviet bombers over Pact territory The remaining aircraft would be used to defend Pact
and provide strategic air defense of their territory and to provide direct combat support to Pact
homelands. ground forces. Some of the remaining aircraft would
- Some fighter-bomber and bomber aircraft would also be kept in readiness for the transition to nuclear
be withheld for use in nuclear operations, and a war.
small number of tactical aircraft would be avail-
able for direct support of the ground forces. 48. The number of aircraft available for the initial
assault of an Air Operation would vary according to45. Pact planners would regard attacks against the extent to which the Pact mobilized and moved
NATO airfields as the principal way of gaining air additional tactical air units within range of NATO
superiority. They would intend such attacks to damage targets. Following are three illustrative postures from
runways and other airfield facilities and thus degrade which the Pact could launch an Air Operation and an
NATO's ability to operate its air forces effectively. estimate of the number of aircraft that would be
They would also expect airfield attacks to account for available in each after the Pact had made provision (as
most of the aircraft NATO would lose during the Air shown in table IV-3) for possible nuclear escalation
Operation. Pact fighter and ground-based air defenses and air support of its ground forces
would be expected, however, to contribute to the
battle for air superiority by inflicting significant losses - Forces in Place. Aircraft allocated to the Air
on NATO's air forces in the air, Operations in this posture would be limited to
46. In its effort to achieve nuclear superiority, the those considered by Pact air force planners to
Pact would probably concentrate its attacks on those have a combat radius that would enable the
bases from which NATO nuclear delivery aircraft aircraft to strike targets from, and return to, their
would operate. Tactical missile launchers would also home bases. Some 1,565 aircraft-350 USSR-
be high-priority targets, but they would be difficult to based LRA bombers and 1,215 tactical aircraft
locate and we believe that operations against them belonging to Soviet and NSWP units in Central
would not involve large numbers of aircraft. Europe-would fall into this category. Soviet
Table IV-2
Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft Available for Use in the Western Theater of Military Operations a
In Central Europe b In the USSR
- - - ---- - - Grand
Soviet NSWP Total Tactical LRA d Total Total
Tactical Aircraft
Fighters . ............................ .......... 630 235 865 360 - 360 1,225
Fighter-Bombers ........................... .... 405 465 870 435 - 435 1,305
Light Bombers ........... ---............. ..... - - - 30 - 30 30
Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Aircraft 140 190 330 105 - 105 435
Total .......................,... .......... 1,175 890 2,065 930 -- 930 2,995
National Air Defense Interceptors.- - 775 775 - - - 775
Long Range Aviation Bombers ....................... - - - - 525 525 525
Total ... .................. .......... 1,175 1,665 2,840 930 525 1,455 4,295
Combat aircraft in combat units. Excludes all trainers and combat aircraft in training or flying-school units.
Pact air forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Tactical air forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts.
d TU-16 Badgers, TU-22 Blinders, and Backfires in the Northwest and Southwest Bomber Commands.
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IV-12
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.