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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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would be used to suppress air defenses, especially 47. Forces. The Pact has approximately 3,000 tac-
IIAWK batteries. They would also be expected to tical aircraft, 775 national air defense fighters, and 525
provide fighter cover for attack aircraft, to pro- LRA bombers available for use in Central Europe.
vide reconnaissance and radioelectronic combat (See table IV-2.) Pact writings and exercise scenarios
(REC) support, and to attack surface-to-surface lead us to estimate that, of these aircraft, about 350
missile units and some NATO airfields. Non- LRA bombers and 1,200 to 2,100 tactical aircraft
Soviet Warsaw Pact national air defense fighters would be made available for use in the Air Operation.
would escort Soviet bombers over Pact territory The remaining aircraft would be used to defend Pact
and provide strategic air defense of their territory and to provide direct combat support to Pact
homelands. ground forces. Some of the remaining aircraft would
- Some fighter-bomber and bomber aircraft would also be kept in readiness for the transition to nuclear
be withheld for use in nuclear operations, and a war.
small number of tactical aircraft would be avail-
able for direct support of the ground forces. 48. The number of aircraft available for the initial
assault of an Air Operation would vary according to45. Pact planners would regard attacks against the extent to which the Pact mobilized and moved
NATO airfields as the principal way of gaining air additional tactical air units within range of NATO
superiority. They would intend such attacks to damage targets. Following are three illustrative postures from
runways and other airfield facilities and thus degrade which the Pact could launch an Air Operation and an
NATO's ability to operate its air forces effectively. estimate of the number of aircraft that would be
They would also expect airfield attacks to account for available in each after the Pact had made provision (as
most of the aircraft NATO would lose during the Air shown in table IV-3) for possible nuclear escalation
Operation. Pact fighter and ground-based air defenses and air support of its ground forces
would be expected, however, to contribute to the
battle for air superiority by inflicting significant losses - Forces in Place. Aircraft allocated to the Air
on NATO's air forces in the air, Operations in this posture would be limited to
46. In its effort to achieve nuclear superiority, the those considered by Pact air force planners to
Pact would probably concentrate its attacks on those have a combat radius that would enable the
bases from which NATO nuclear delivery aircraft aircraft to strike targets from, and return to, their
would operate. Tactical missile launchers would also home bases. Some 1,565 aircraft-350 USSR-
be high-priority targets, but they would be difficult to based LRA bombers and 1,215 tactical aircraft
locate and we believe that operations against them belonging to Soviet and NSWP units in Central
would not involve large numbers of aircraft. Europe-would fall into this category. Soviet
Table IV-2
Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft Available for Use in the Western Theater of Military Operations a
In Central Europe b In the USSR
- - - ---- - - Grand
Soviet NSWP Total Tactical LRA d Total Total
Tactical Aircraft
Fighters . ............................ .......... 630 235 865 360 - 360 1,225
Fighter-Bombers ........................... .... 405 465 870 435 - 435 1,305
Light Bombers ........... ---............. ..... - - - 30 - 30 30
Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Aircraft 140 190 330 105 - 105 435
Total .......................,... .......... 1,175 890 2,065 930 -- 930 2,995
National Air Defense Interceptors.- - 775 775 - - - 775
Long Range Aviation Bombers ....................... - - - - 525 525 525
Total ... .................. .......... 1,175 1,665 2,840 930 525 1,455 4,295
Combat aircraft in combat units. Excludes all trainers and combat aircraft in training or flying-school units.
Pact air forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Tactical air forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts.
d TU-16 Badgers, TU-22 Blinders, and Backfires in the Northwest and Southwest Bomber Commands.
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IV-12
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.