Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
Top 41. Reliability of NSWP Forces. While the USSR Pact's chances for victory in the theater. The Soviets regards most of its allies with habitual distrust-and at regard air superiority as a condition in which NATO's one time or another most of them have merited air and air defense forces would cease to pose a serious distrust by rebellion or political instability-it has threat to the operations of Pact ground, air, and naval nevertheless entrusted them to carry out wartime forces. The Pact plans to achieve these objectives by functions potentially critical to the Pact's prospects for conducting a large-scale, theaterwide conventional air success in a conflict with NATO. The East Europeans offensive during the first several days of hostilities. provide more than half the Pact combat divisions in The Soviets refer to this offensive as the Air Operation Central Europe, and the Soviets count on attacks by (see inset). Polish units in the north and Czechoslovak units in the south to tie down large NATO forces and permit the concentration of Soviet and East German forces in the THE AIR OPERATION critical central sector. The major lines of communica- tion from the USSR run through Poland, East Ger- This is a Soviet concept denoting the terpo- many, and Czechoslovakia, and nationals of these rary use of air forces belonging to different countries are chiefly responsible for operating and organizations in a large-scale coordinated effort maintaining them. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air de- to achieve a specific objective. Attainment of the fenses are intended to provide forward air defense for objectives of an Air Operation is seen as having a the western USSR and .to protect the Pact's logistic and potentially decisive effect on the outcome of a rear area support. All of this suggests that the Soviets campaign or of the war itself. In World War II the Soviets mounted a number of Air Operations have reconciled themselves to whatever reliability with the aim of destroying enemy air forces. problems they envision and have made a calculated These operations lasted an average of four to five decision to rely on effective NSWP performance in days and their initiation usually coincided with the contingencies for which they plan military the start of a major Soviet, or anticipated Ger- operations. man, ground offensive. In a NATO-Pact conflict 42. Many features of the Pact tend to assure the the Air Operation concept would govern- the reliability of the NSWP allies. The Pact is dominated employment of the Pact's strategic and tactical by Soviet officers, and major Soviet forces are sta- air forces during the first few days of conven- tioned in four key counties. Allegiance is sought by the tional hostilities. The objective of an Air Opera- integration of NSWP officers into the Pact command tion in Central Europe would be to destroy as structure, where they participate on a controlled basis. much of NATO's air and theater nuclear forces Promising, NSWP officers are schooled in the Soviet as possible. Union and indoctrinated with Soviet views and atti- tudes. Most officers and about half the noncommis- sioned officers are members of Communist parties or 44. The goals and principal characteristics of the organizations; unreliable officers are dismissed. The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended to writings, human sources, and exercise scenarios: ensure their early involvement in a war. East German - The Pact would commit most of its tactical forces are interleaved with the Soviets, to ensure their aircraft and a large number of its Long Range reliability even against other Germans. The missions Aviation (LRA) bombers to a series of air assaults assigned the Polish and Czechoslovak forces are initially designed to achieve tactical surprise at the outset against their traditional enemies, the Germans. of hostilities and lasting for the first two to four days of combat. The Air Offensive in Central Europe - Each assault, consisting of two or three waves of 43. Pact planners regard NATO's tactical air forces aircraft, would begin with a concerted effort to in Central Europe as a formidable threat to Pact destroy or suppress air defenses in corridors ground, air, and nuclear forces during the initial, through which attacking aircraft would proceed conventional phase of war, and as one of NATO's to strike airfields, nuclear-weapons-associated fa- principal means for delivering nuclear strikes in cilities, and command, control, and communica- Europe. Consequently, they consider the early attain- tions facilities. ment of air superiority and destruction of much of - LRA bombers would constitute the primary force NATO's tactical nuclear forces to be critical to the for attacking airfields. Most tactical air forces IV-1 1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.